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In Beijing in 1956 the leaders of two Communist countries got to-
gether in a corner and commiserated. The background was a glorious gather-
ing: the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
The older of the two, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej of Romania, did most of
the talking as he complained that party colleagues had taken him to task
over his “cult of personality.” As evidence, they had pointed to his image
adorning buildings everywhere and countless factories named after him. But
Gheorghiu-Dej told his interlocutor, Enver Hoxha, the First Secretary of the
Party of Labor of Albania (PPSh), that in fact no such cult had existed in Ro-
mania. How could it have? He had been the ªrst to criticize exaggerations
about himself. Hoxha knew what his counterpart was talking about. He, too,
had occasionally objected in PPSh Politburo meetings to all kinds of excesses:
plans to name factories and schools after him; party ofªcials’ eagerness to con-
vert his childhood home into a Communist shrine; and the engrained habit
of showering him with gifts at birthdays and anniversaries. On the other
hand, Tirana, like Bucharest, was teeming with oversize silk portraits of the
middle-aged leader, whose name, etched in solid red and gold, abounded on
rooftops and façades. Moreover, Hoxha, like Gheorghiu-Dej, was busy grum-
bling in Beijing about the onerous challenges they were forced to confront in
1956.1
1. Hoxha recounted the conversation with Gheorghiu-Dej at a Politburo meeting and at a party ple-
num on 22 October. The story seemed to lend support to the view that overzealous apparatchiks were
responsible for the “cult of personality.” See Report to the PPSh Politburo, 9 October 1956, in Arkivi
Qendror Shtetëror [Central State Archive], Tirana (AQSH), Fondi (F.) 14/AP, Organet Udhëheqëse
[Leading Organs] (OU), Viti (V.) 1956, Dosja (Dos.) 54, Fleta (Fl.) 25. In an earlier conversation in
Pyongyang, Kim Il-Sung complained to the Albanians about an opposition group that had emerged at
a party plenum earlier that year. Hoxha in his memoirs skips his conversation with Gheorghiu-Dej—
instead denouncing the Romanian leader—and revises the position he took in Beijing. See Enver
Hoxha, The Khrushchevites (Tirana: 8 Nëntori, 1980), pp. 251–253.
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Such was the international dimension of events in 1956—a series of ac-
tions and accidents originating at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in February and culminating with the
bloody suppression of the revolt in Hungary in early November.2 In between,
leaders throughout the Communist world tried to cope with the repercussions
of Nikita Khrushchev’s secret speech as they spread from Moscow to the west-
ern Soviet republics and on to Warsaw, Budapest, and the Balkans. Neither
Khrushchev nor anyone else knew what the outcome of the Soviet leader’s
gambit would be, but this did not hinder a variety of actors—from Gulag re-
turnees to ambitious intellectuals and socialist instructors—from interpreting
de-Stalinization in their own terms.3 Therein lay a danger: As with most So-
viet imports to the Soviet bloc, reformist urges and reshufºing in the Soviet
Union were apt to generate unexpected outcomes even in far away locales.
Still, not everyone went along with de-Stalinization, and some did their best
to resist its destabilizing potential.4 (“Ironically, the de-Stalinization move-
ment” one author notes, “helped to create in Korean communism many new
Stalinist characteristics.”)5 De-Stalinization was thus not merely unpredict-
able; it was far from inevitable.
One of the ªrst shocks in 1956 occurred far away from Moscow, in Alba-
nia, where party functionaries launched a critique of the establishment at the
5
Defying De-Stalinization: Albania’s 1956
2. Several compelling studies based on newly available sources focus on these events. See Mark
Kramer, “The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New
Findings,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 33, No. 2 (April 1998), pp. 163–214; Csaba Békés,
“The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 16, Cold War
International History Project, Washington, DC, 1996; and Charles Gati, Failed Illusions: Moscow,
Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center
Press, 2006). The Institute for the Study of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution in Budapest has also pub-
lished numerous valuable accounts.
3. Amir Weiner, “The Empires Pay a Visit: Gulag Returnees, East European Rebellions, and Soviet
Frontier Politics,” The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 78. No. 2 (June 2006), pp. 333–376; and Susan
Reid, “De-Stalinization and Taste, 1953–1963,” Journal of Design History, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1997),
pp. 177–201. “For all its rhetoric of empowerment,” argues Reid, “the cultural reformism of the Thaw
was paternalistic rather than populist.” See also, Susan Reid, “Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and
the De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev,” Slavic Review, Vol.
61, No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 212–252.
4. The Chinese were among the ªrst to doubt Khrushchev’s chosen path, although Beijing initially
registered no public complaints. See Péter Vámos, “Evolution and Revolution: Sino-Hungarian Rela-
tions and the 1956 Revolution,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 54, Cold War International History
Project, Washington, DC, 2006. The other example was North Korea. See Andrei Lankov, Crisis in
North Korea: The Failure of De-Stalinization, 1956 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005).
5. “Stalinist characteristics” included pervasive central planning, forced collectivization in agriculture,
preference to heavy industry, continued promotion of Marxism-Leninism, a robust cult of Kim Il-
Sung’s revolutionary tradition, and an emphasis on class struggle and “ideological class education.” See
Masao Okonogi, “North Korean Communism: In Search of Its Prototype,” in Dae-Sook Suh, ed., Ko-
rean Studies: New Paciªc Currents (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), pp. 177–206,
esp. 202.
Tirana Party Conference in April.6 This article shows that under Hoxha’s tight
grip Albania ultimately rejected de-Stalinization. For both internal and exter-
nal reasons, Hoxha was able to vindicate his position against Yugoslavia’s
brand of socialism abroad, fortify his rule at home, and claim even greater aid
from Moscow, Beijing, and the Soviet bloc. The outcome was curious: a
country that strove toward further integration within the Communist world
but without de-Stalinization. Ordinarily, de-Stalinization has been viewed as
an opening, but in postwar Albania, as François Fejtö observed, Stalinism is
what lifted the country from international isolation.7 In addition to receiving
hefty Soviet loans and imported technology, PPSh leaders credited Iosif Stalin
with having saved Albania from Yugoslav annexation in 1948. Rather than an
opening, therefore, de-Stalinization was viewed as a major threat. In 1956, the
PPSh establishment hardly distinguished between ideological and security
concerns.8 Any modiªcation in one direction would necessarily affect every-
thing else (or so the party line went).9 Reforms at home became synonymous
with a rapprochement with Josip Broz Tito, whom Hoxha had long depicted
as a villain. If the Albanian leader survived these ordeals, he did so in large
part because of duplicitous positioning at key moments as well as contingent
events beyond his control. This complicated mix of external and internal fac-
tors, as well as bloc-level and regional dynamics, makes Albania a rare case
6
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6. Observers of Communist Albania took note of the Tirana Party Conference and speculated on its
impact on the country’s foreign relations, but sources at the time were few and far between, and
Hoxha’s memoirs present a distorted view of the affair. For example, declassiªed materials support nei-
ther the allegation of a Moscow conspiracy to eliminate Hoxha in 1956 nor that of an internal coup.
See Stavro Skendi, “Albania,” in Stephen Kertesz, ed., East Central Europe and the World: Developments
in the Post-Stalin Era (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962), pp. 197–228; Daniel
Tretiak, “The Founding of the Sino-Albanian Entente,” The China Quarterly, No. 10 (April–June
1962), pp. 123–143; Harry Hamm, Albania—China’s Beachhead in Europe (New York: Praeger,
1963), pp. 100–101; William Grifªth, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1963), pp. 22–25; and Nicholas C. Pano, The People’s Republic of Albania (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1968), pp. 117–134. In Albania, the Tirana Party Conference has generated consid-
erable interest in recent years. Yet, despite memoirs, interviews, and recollections, systematic studies
have been rare. See Ana Lalaj, “Tirana’s Conference of April 1956—An Abortive Spring of Democracy
in Albania,” in Dan Cätänuq and Vasile Buga, eds., Putere qi societate: Lagärul comunist sub impactul
destalinizärii, 1956 (Bucharest: Institutul Naºional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 2006), pp. 34–63;
and Demir Dyrmishi, “Konferenca e PPSH së Tiranës, shkaqe dhe rrjedhoja (Prill 1956),” Studime
historike, No. 1–2 (2002), pp. 115–130.
7. François Fejtö, “La deviazione albanese,” Comunità, No. 107 (1963), pp. 18–32.
8. “During Stalin’s lifetime,” one author wrote, “the Albanian leaders did his bidding with enthusiasm
not merely because they had to, but also because the Soviet dictator’s policies and methods of rule were
in harmony with their own personal interests as well as with their view of Albania’s national interests.”
See Anton Logoreci, “Albania—The Anabaptists of European Communism,” Problems of Commu-
nism, Vol. 16, No. 3 (May–June 1967), pp. 22–28, esp. 23.
9. “In effect,” Fejtö recalled, “the Albanian regime was based after 1948 on a system supported by two
claims: fanatical hostility against Yugoslavia and, domestically, Stalinism to the bitter end. To take away
these foundations would be to endanger the whole regime.” Fejto, “La deviazione albanese,” p. 25,
emphasis added.
study for analyzing the interplay of ideology and geopolitical shifts—a combi-
nation that made socialist states “both stable and precarious, monolithic and
brittle.”10
Given the paucity of archival research on postwar Albania, the narrative
here generally follows a conventional chronology. Analytically, however, the
article is divided into two sections. The ªrst treats 1956 as an opportunity to
look into the Albanian Communist party as an information society. A central
puzzle is how rumors and speculation about Khrushchev’s speech and the en-
suing de-Stalinization circulated across the country. Tracing the involvement
of delegates at the Tirana Party Conference, ordinary party members in the
provinces, and students enrolled in universities in Moscow, Budapest, and
Warsaw reveals how the party machinery made external factors operative
within Albania. The second part of the article focuses on high-level decision-
making during the latter half of 1956. The violent unrest in Budapest deeply
unsettled the PPSh establishment but also provided a temporary solution to
the Yugoslav dilemma.
The two parts of the article are closely linked. By tracing the intersection
of these themes, we can take stock of the tensions that 1956 brought to the
surface—tensions that lingered for many years after the bloody intervention
in Budapest. Although the article is not a social history of 1956 in Albania,
the focus on the Communist party itself—top to bottom—is based on the as-
sumption that the party was a form of society. The reasoning behind such a
choice goes beyond the obvious interest in elucidating ªndings from newly
declassiªed archival sources. In the context of 1956 across the Communist
world, tiny Albania was both strangely unique and vastly familiar.
Edge of Empires
“Albania is the smallest and most primitive of the satellites,” a U.S. National
Security Council (NSC) staff study observed in December 1953, adding that
the country was also “the only one of the Soviet European satellites which is
geographically isolated from the rest of the Soviet bloc.” This situation pre-
sented “a peculiar problem to the Soviet Union whose only uninterrupted ac-
cess to the Albanians is by sea.”11 The report correctly observes that Soviet
inºuence in Albania was based not so much on direct military deployments as
7
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10. Stephen Kotkin (with a contribution by Jan T. Gross), Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of
the Communist Establishment (New York: Modern Library, 2009), p. 18.
11. NSC 174, “United States Policy toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe,” 11 December
1953, transcribed in Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne, and János Rainer, eds., The 1956 Hungarian Revo-
lution: A History in Documents (Budapest: CEU Press, 2002), pp. 34–53.
on “strategic inªltration.” Western intelligence services initially considered
Albania to be the best option for a rollback intervention. By 1955, however,
policymakers in Washington and London had changed their minds.12 What
the NSC did not fully recognize was that Soviet inªltration in Albania was en-
abled by native elites, that external aid helped maintain a fragile domestic so-
cial balance, and that the small Mediterranean country had never really func-
tioned outside the orbit of empire. As the Hungarian émigré writer Paul
Lendvai noted, Albania’s independence had never been assured, and the coun-
try had “always been an economic liability to the given protector or con-
queror.”13
The Albanian example does not ªt neatly into a story of forced
Sovietization from abroad and resistance from within. To say that Albania was
closer to an “empire by invitation” is not to imply popular consent per se but
merely to point out that distinctly local interests coincided with the rise of a
Soviet-dominated camp in Europe.14 The roots of Hoxha’s party-state were
native and heavily grounded among the Tosks of the south. His regime, more-
over, relied extensively on structures of kinship and personal loyalties. Even a
casual glance at the party-state hierarchy shows that private ownership of
property was eliminated in the interest of state ownership. By the mid-1950s,
the positions of PPSh First Secretary, prime minister, Central Committee
head of propaganda, and Tirana party chief were all in the hands of two mar-
ried couples.15 Power in socialist Albania was centralized in a small cluster of
low-rise villas along the capital’s southern edge. But if this was a modern vari-
ation on “patrimonialism,” it came with access to a vast empire—the Soviet
one.16 Although not everyone shared the sentiment, for many in the back-
ward, impoverished Balkan state the Soviet empire turned out to signify noth-
ing less than the promise of modernity.
Albania in the 1950s was a country of contradictions. Its major cities
8
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12. By 1955, both the United States and Britain recognized Albania’s right to independence and pre-
ferred to maintain the status quo rather than risk regional complications with Greece, Italy, and Yugo-
slavia. See “Anglo-U.S. Attitudes to Albanian Affairs” (Conªdential), February 1955, in The National
Archives of the United Kingdom (TNAUK), Foreign Ofªce (FO) 371/117602, R A1016/9. For a
summary of U.S. strategies vis-à-vis Albania during this period, see Gati, Failed Illusions, pp. 86–90.
13. Paul Lendvai, Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans (Garden City, NJ:
Doubleday, 1969), p. 179.
14. With “empire by invitation,” Geir Lundestad means the proliferation of U.S. inºuence in Western
Europe during the ªrst postwar decade. See Geir Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation? The United
States and Western Europe, 1945–1952,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Autumn 1986),
pp. 263–277.
15. Enver Hoxha and Nexhmije Xhuglini were married on 1 January 1945 in what she would later call
a “partisans’ wedding.” The marriage between Mehmet Shehu and Fiqret Sanxhaktari was similarly a
product of war. See Nexhmije Hoxha, Jeta ime me Enverin (Tirana: Lira, 2001).
16. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1978).
were undergoing considerable transformations, and new Soviet-designed in-
dustrial towns were springing up out of nowhere. State enterprises conspicu-
ously replaced small shopkeepers and neighborhood markets. Yet at the same
time, the state never quite managed to feed the population. White bread was a
rarity; the workforce and the typically numerous peasant families survived on
tough corn bread. Party slogans declared corn excellent for cattle and human
beings alike, but many seem to have disagreed. “If that is so,” quipped a dis-
graced Communist ofªcial placed under surveillance, “then why do the Sovi-
ets here demand to eat white bread?”17 Newspapers insisted that production
quotas were being fulªlled, but ordinary people consumed less meat in 1953
than they had in 1949.18 For years the government talked of ending food ra-
tioning, but it persisted until October 1957. Restrictions were only partially
removed for clothes and an array of industrial goods, and even then prices
spiked up, worker production quotas were raised, and the popular mood
turned sour.19 To make matters worse, crops fared especially poorly in 1956,
forcing the government to double normal import quotas for grain to 100,000
tons. Exports were meager, lines in front of stores long. Even as the party
painstakingly built a myth around the liberation war, the war for bread was far
from won.
The two major goals of the decade—collectivization and industrializa-
tion—also inºicted considerable hardship on the population. Collectivization
faced serious obstacles not least because of the scarcity of arable land and the
mountainous terrain. Relative to most of the other Soviet-bloc countries, col-
lectivization in Albania was slower, picking up only during the second half
of the decade.20 Still, by 1956 more than 8,714 landowners had been com-
pletely expropriated and roughly ten thousand others had been allowed small
9
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17. Memorandum from the State Security Department (Sigurimi) to the PPSh CC, in AQSH, F. 14/
AP, Drejtoria Administrative [Administrative Department] (DA), V. 1956, Dos. 166, Fl. 30.
18. Transcripts from meetings of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers in 1953, in AQSH, F. 490
(Council of Ministers), V. 1953, Dos. 706, Fl. 226–227.
19. Based on a conversation with the Italian minister in Tirana in late 1955, the British ambassador in
Belgrade reported that foreign diplomats also struggled with daily life in the Albanian capital. “In
Tirana even the most common foodstuffs were almost totally unobtainable,” he observed. “There was
a sort of diplomatic shop but it had no stocks, and for such common necessities as eggs and meat, etc.,
the black market, at very high prices, was the only practical means of supply.” See Roberts to Foreign
Ofªce (Conªdential), 10 December 1955, in TNAUK, FO 371/117602, R A1016/9. Partial mea-
sures to eliminate rationing in early 1956, coupled with a revision in worker categories and increased
production quotas, proved deeply unpopular when a considerable number of families saw their actual
earnings decline.
20. Albanian data on collective farms are compared to Soviet Foreign Ministry sources from roughly
the same period. “O nekotorykh voprosakh kooperirovaniya sel’skogo khoziyistva v evropeiskikh
stranakh narodnoi demokratii” (Top Secret), 19 August 1955, in Rossiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv
Noveishei Istorii [Russian State Archive of Contemporary History] (RGANI), Fond (F.) 5, Opis’ (Op.)
28, Delo (D.) 286, List (L.) 6.
parcels.21 Some 40 percent of the land was brought into the “socialist sector,”
either in collective farms (696 by August 1956) or as part of state-owned agri-
cultural enterprises. Not surprisingly, the popular mood on this issue was pes-
simistic. Security police reports reveal that as government ofªcials exerted ever
greater pressure on peasants to collectivize, increasing numbers of families
begged to get out of existing collective farms.22 The other goal—building
heavy industries—proceeded on borrowed money. A trial-and-error phase,
also known as the ªrst Five-Year Plan (1951–1955), led to bewildering con-
tradictions. The Stalin Textile Complex in the conªnes of Tirana was one
of many impressive new factories to pop up, but it produced little. Stores
stocked clogs, high-priced bags, and women’s coats but offered almost no
milk, meat, kerosene, or other staples. Industrial goods ºowing out of the
newly minted factories were generally of poor quality, something the state-
owned consumer enterprises were the ªrst to admit.23 The reasons were mani-
fold: a largely unskilled labor force, low-level technology, and unrealistic pro-
duction quotas for little pay.
This was only part of the backdrop to the events in 1956. The ªrst post-
war decade also brought about new institutions, revised social relations, and
novel practices. Schools expanded, the number of publications swelled, and
the government waged a ruthless war against illiteracy. An unprecedented mo-
bilization of people took place, as the politically suspect were ejected from cit-
ies and the young were brought into the Working Youth Union. Before any-
one realized it, the party and state bureaucracy had ballooned.24 In 1954 some
45,000 people reportedly were working for either the party or the government
(excluding army and security forces) in a country of less than 1.4 million.25
10
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21. PPSh CC propaganda materials prepared on the occasion of conferences held on 7–8 November
1956, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, Drejtoria e Agit-Propit [Agitprop Department] (DAP), V. 1956, Dos. 89,
Fl. 49. A Soviet memorandum (in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 28, D. 286, L. 34) acknowledges that local mea-
sures against alleged kulaks had “erroneously” hit hundreds of middle and poor peasants.
22. Interior Ministry memorandum on external and internal enemies in 1956 (Top Secret), 27 De-
cember 1956, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, OU, V. 1956, Dos. 60, Fl. 27.
23. See, for example, a report from the Elbasan party committee (Secret), 6 October 1956, in AQSH,
F. 14/AP, Drejtoria e Organeve të Partisë, Rinisë dhe të Bashkimeve Profesionale—Seksioni i
informacionit [Department of Party Organs, Youth and Trade Unions–Information Section]
(DOPRBP-SI), V. 1956, Dos. 10, Fl. 168.
24. In June 1953 Lavrentii Beria reprimanded Hoxha: “not even Rockefeller or Morgan could afford
to maintain such a bureaucracy.” See Hoxha’s report to the PPSh Politburo on conversations with So-
viet leaders, 20–22 June 1953, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, OU, V. 1953, Dos. 23, Fl. 1. On the 1953 Soviet
recommendations to the PPSh and other Soviet bloc parties, see Mark Kramer, “The Early Post-Stalin
Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe: Internal-External Linkages in Soviet Pol-
icy Making (Part 1),” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter 1999), pp. 3–55.
25. Mehmet Shehu in the PPSh Politburo, 4 January 1954, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, OU, V. 1954, Dos. 4,
Fl. 13. Three years later, after considerable efforts to curtail the bureaucracy and following repeated
Party ranks similarly swelled, but less than one in ªve members was a worker
by 1956. (Appalled, Soviet ofªcials urged Albanian leaders to bring more
workers into the workers’ party.) Hoxha’s formidable grip on power suffered a
blow after Stalin’s death in March 1953, as Soviet leaders forced him to relin-
quish his posts as minister of foreign affairs and minister of defense. After
consultations with Khrushchev a year later, he also gave up his seat as prime
minister, which went to his wartime colleague Mehmet Shehu. Nevertheless,
Hoxha not only persisted at the party helm but later cited this forced shufºing
as irrefutable evidence that the PPSh had been among the ªrst Communist
parties to expunge the cult of personality from its ranks.
Bonds forged during the war persevered in the state security apparatus
and the armed forces.26 The Sigurimi (State Security) became infamous and
widely feared as its ranks expanded with the graduates of a one-year training
course in the Soviet Union.27 Its personnel consisted mostly of war veterans
who valued the opportunity to carry on the ªght—and earn wages—even af-
ter the war had ended. But the security apparatus also offered almost unlim-
ited possibilities for exploitation. By the mid-1950s, abuse within its ranks
had become so rampant that the issue had to be taken up at the highest party
levels.28 Under party control, the Sigurimi waged a vicious war. By autumn
1956 two out of ªve prisoners in the country had been incarcerated for “anti-
state activities.”29 Yet if party leaders found it beneªcial to carve the security
11
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Soviet criticism, the number of state and party employees decreased to 25,000. Transcript of meeting
between PPSh CC Secretary Hysni Kapo, Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu, and head of the Chinese
parliamentary delegation Peng Zhen, 16 January 1957, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, Marrëdhëniet me Partinë
Komuniste të Kinës [Relations with the CCP] (M-PKK), V. 1957, Dos. 1, Fl. 33.
26. “Under the whip of Enver Hoxha, elected general commander of 30,000 troops at the time, Alba-
nia moved from occupation straight to a dictatorship of the proletariat, under the domination of a
party that in effect was, as in Yugoslavia, a revolutionary militia impatient to retaliate against old rul-
ing classes and conªscate their properties and privileges.” See Fejtö, “La deviazione albanese,” p. 20.
27. The Sigurimi had become so notorious by 1956 that the monitored conversations it reported to
the party were replete with fearful statements (and a plethora of jokes) about the Sigurimi itself. From
1953 to 1956 the number of persons “being processed” (në përpunim) by security operatives doubled
(by 1959 the number had tripled), as did the number of active operatives. See the State Security De-
partment study on anti-party groups, n.d. [most likely after 1972], in Arkivi i Ministrisë së Punëve të
Brendshme [Archive of the Ministry of Interior], Tirana (AMPB), bound book, p. 97.
28. Sigurimi abuses came up in the immediate aftermath of Beria’s purge in the Soviet Union. See
Transcript of PPSh Politburo meeting, 27 August 1953, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, OU, V. 1953, Dos. 28,
Fl. 26. Three years later, similar abuses were reported in a CC memorandum to the Interior Ministry
(Secret), 6 January 1956, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, DA, V. 1956, Dos. 160, Fl. 3–7. See also a related CC
report on problems within the Interior Ministry apparatus, 6 January 1956, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, DA,
V. 1956, Dos. 160, Fl. 8–12. These included examples from the Zadrimë camp where inmates had re-
portedly been forced to carry local chiefs on their back across a river. An Interior Ministry report to the
Politburo from later in 1965 mentions arbitrary executions, rape, and other instances of physical vio-
lence. In AQSH, F. 14/AP, OU, V. 1956, Dos. 60, Fl. 37.
29. Interior Ministry memorandum, in AQSH, F.14/AP, OU, V. 1956, Dos. 60, Fl. 43.
apparatus out of the wartime partisan movement, the army’s fate in the post-
war period was less obvious. Against Albanian hopes, Stalin advised Hoxha in
1951 not to expand the armed forces, which would be “too costly.”30 Facing
enormous ªnancial hurdles, PPSh leaders implored the Soviet Union in June
1954 to underwrite and maintain their entire military establishment and to
supply aircraft, artillery, weapons, equipment, and clothing.31 Soviet ship-
ments did not preclude further reductions in personnel, which bred discon-
tent among ofªcers. To make up for the shortfall in troops, the government
issued weapons to more than 16,000 individuals mobilized in auxiliary de-
fense groups.32 In January 1956, following a meeting of Communist parties in
Moscow, Hoxha ordered yet another wave of demobilization.33 These mea-
sures, too, proved deeply unpopular with military personnel.
As this overview suggests, the upheaval of the liberation war had carried
into the building of socialism in the 1950s but with a crucial twist—social
revolution came with access to a new system of exchange reaching across Eur-
asia. By 1956, Albania had received roughly a billion rubles in loans from so-
cialist countries (more than half from the Soviet Union alone), excluding mil-
itary aid. “In our country every single person owes on average one thousand
rubles,” Shehu explained to a Chinese delegation in 1957.34 The massive de-
scent into debt surely troubled party leaders, and it also encouraged specula-
tion about leadership shufºing. In the vast redistribution system that was the
Soviet bloc, however, PPSh leaders became increasingly deft at exploiting “so-
cialist solidarity.” As the Soviet Foreign Ministry argued in a note to Mikhail
Suslov in September 1956, aid to Albania was particularly important in light
of the country’s overwhelming Muslim majority, its historical ties to the Mid-
dle East, and the opportunity to prop it up as an example of social and eco-
12
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30. Hoxha’s notes from 2 April 1951 meeting with Stalin, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, Marrëdhëniet me
Partinë Komuniste (b) të Bashkimit Sovjetik [Relations with the CPSU] (M-PK(b)BS), V. 1951, Dos.
15, Fl. 1. Two years later, Beria warned that the Albanian army was packed with enemies, but Hoxha
disagreed. By 1956, some 96 percent of army ofªcers were party members, compared to 100 percent
of personnel in the security apparatus. See Shehu’s remarks to Peng, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, M-PKK, V.
1957, Dos. 1, Fl. 36.
31. Report to the PPSh Politburo on conversations with the CPSU leadership, 30 June 1954, in
AQSH, F. 14/AP, OU, V. 1954, Dos. 18, Fl. 2, pp. 9–13. See also the transcript from the meeting, in
AQSH, F. 14/AP, M-PK(b)BS, V. 1954, Dos. 1, Fl. 1–9.
32. Interior Ministry memorandum, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, OU, V. 1956, Dos. 60, Fl. 43.
33. No transcript has surfaced of the 14 January 1956 Politburo meeting during which Hoxha re-
ported on the meeting in Moscow. Only the subsequent decision to continue demobilization is avail-
able. See Protocol No. 3 (Top Secret), in AQSH, F. 14/AP, OU, V. 1956, Dos. 30, Fl. 1.
34. Paying back all loans and interest by 1980, Shehu explained to Peng in early 1957, would entail
keeping a ªxed (and very low) standard of living for two and a half decades. In 1956, imports counted
for twice as much as exports, so loans were used for the balance. Transcript of meeting with Peng
Zhen, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, M-PKK, V. 1957, Dos. 1, Fl. 33–34.
nomic development for formerly colonized peoples.35 Soviet aid came with a
ºood of personnel, specialists, advisers, planners, and apparatchiks whom
Tirana eagerly demanded and put to use.36 Not since the Ottoman Empire
had Albania participated in such a broad exchange of people and goods. This
time, however, local elites could both exploit the riches of empire and uphold
national independence. By the mid-1950s, tourists from the Soviet bloc were
trickling toward the country’s Mediterranean shores, and young Albanians
were showing up for university classes in Prague, Warsaw, Moscow, and Le-
ningrad. In May 1955 the country became a founding member of the Warsaw
Treaty Organization. When Hoxha repeatedly referred in public to the Soviet
Union as the country’s savior, his point must have seemed like a statement of
the obvious to ordinary Albanians.37
The Party Is the Party’s Enemy
One of the most noteworthy aspects of the history of the Soviet bloc is just
how quickly Khrushchev’s secret speech at the Twentieth Congress of the
CPSU, delivered in Moscow on 25 February, became a conversation topic ev-
erywhere.38 This might seem less surprising in the case of, say, Poland rather
than Albania, where party leaders remained highly secretive.39 Still, the me-
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(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 47–53.
39. Hoxha’s report to the PPSh Politburo is contained in AQSH, F. 14/AP, OU, V. 1956, Dos. 34.
chanics underlying the circulation of rumors tell us a great deal about how
Soviet-bloc societies were structured. Despite concerted efforts to keep
Khrushchev’s speech secret, PPSh leaders were confronted with the curious, if
equally distressing, realization that the party machinery itself was facilitating
the diffusion of “anti-party” rumors. Eavesdropping on a Western radio
broadcast or getting wind of a Yugoslav news bulletin surely helped. No So-
viet newspaper correspondents lived in Tirana, and whatever the TASS news
agency sent through came in after ten at night, too late to be translated in
time to counter Western radio broadcasts the following day.40 But once news
became available to some, the party ensured dissemination. Like the nervous
system running through the body, the party was essential in controlling and
transmitting all sorts of crucial information, but it could be equally effective
in spreading shocks and provoking seizures. The system was formidable yet
fragile and was immensely difªcult to control.
Hoxha was initially determined to keep Khrushchev’s speech secret. Al-
though he summarized it at a Politburo meeting after he returned from Mos-
cow, he ordered delegates at the Seventeenth Plenum on 2 March to close
their notebooks and pocket their pencils.41 “This matter,” he instructed them,
“will stay here and will not leave this room because nothing will be told to the
party about it.”42 He proceeded to give a summary of the report “from mem-
ory” but going into some detail on Stalin’s assorted wrongdoings. Utter confu-
sion engulfed those who heard Hoxha’s remarks. What would happen next?
Hoxha uttered something vague about drawing valuable lessons from the
CPSU. He also reminded delegates that the party was above everyone and ev-
erything. As for the ubiquitous and gigantic portraits of party leaders on dis-
play everywhere, he clariªed that “they still have them in the Soviet Union”
but that they might consider emphasizing Lenin from then onward.43 Accord-
ingly, Stalin’s name disappeared from ofªcial pronouncements over the fol-
lowing weeks. The party base, however, received no special directives or
instructions. Even when the CPSU resolutions ªnally reached Albanian party
activists, local members were not allowed to ask questions. Neither was the ple-
num’s resolution made public. Nevertheless, within a matter of weeks, despite
the secrecy and foot-dragging, the whole party apparatus was caught up in the
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42. Transcript of the Seventeenth Plenum of the CC of the Second PPSh Congress, 2 March 1956, in
AQSH, F. 14/AP, OU, V. 1956, Dos. 24, Fl. 15.
43. Ibid., Fl. 28.
fever of the Twentieth Congress. If anything, the party establishment’s tactics
provoked even more curiosity and speculation among the rank-and-ªle.
How the central apparatus expected to keep the matter secret was far
from clear. For months the Central Committee had mobilized the party base
in preparation for the CPSU Congress, pressuring members to read related
party documents and “increase correspondence with Soviet collectives.”44 As
the Soviet embassy in Tirana informed Moscow, Albanian newspapers and ra-
dio stations covered the Soviet Party Congress in detail, and the print run of
the resolutions was in the thousands. Even those who were suspicious of
Western sources, as one witness observed, were glued to their radios.45 The
party’s elaborate propaganda efforts made secrecy almost impossible.46 Even as
Khrushchev was lambasting Stalin in Moscow, a report from the Berat party
committee noted that local party members were raising questions about the
conspicuous absence of Stalin’s name in the incoming reports from Moscow.47
By the ªrst week in March, a considerable mass of the party base was aware of
Khrushchev’s speech.48 What also thwarted any attempt at secrecy was the on-
going mobilization for the PPSh’s own Third Party Congress, scheduled for
later that spring. Across the country, party organizations were in the middle of
electing delegates and ªling reports. Party ranks had therefore been doubly
mobilized—in cities, villages, factories, and enterprises—by the time rumors
of Khrushchev’s speech reached Albania. Most of the party gatherings leading
up to the PPSh congress were uneventful. But one, the Tirana Party Confer-
ence, turned into a tumultuous affair. Because the party later launched de-
tailed investigations into the matter, the conference can be reconstructed in
considerable detail.49
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The Tirana Party Conference took place in a climate of growing griev-
ances over the country’s economy. While ofªcial rhetoric was boastful, ration-
ing persisted and hunger was rampant. A major source of discontent was the
perceived luxury of the party elite: an off-limits residential enclave composed
of one-family villas, chauffeured service cars, and exclusive stores, clinics, and
kindergartens.50 The echelons of the Central Committee, moreover, included
more than a handful of married couples at a time when party directives sternly
warned enterprises against employing married couples for fear of “fraterniza-
tion” (familjaritet). Whether rooted in intense jealousy or honest outrage, re-
sentment against elite perquisites was real and palpable. The concern was not
so much that the Bllok, the exclusive residential area where Politburo mem-
bers snatched up real estate, was an island of conspicuous afºuence.51 (Com-
munist elites were invariably afºicted by a ghastly sense of style.) Rather, the
evident hardship that surrounded the Bllok and turned into galling misery the
farther one traveled from the capital made elite privileges a constant subject of
speculation. Perhaps in some of the other people’s democracies the sight of a
chauffeured car carrying the First Secretary’s wife, or the idea of housemaids
and personal chefs, would have been less jarring. But the effect was markedly
different in a country lacking enough buses and trucks to effectively transport
people, building materials, and imported goods—and where many still lived
in barracks.
Discontent in 1950s Albania was not geographically bound. So why did
it erupt in the capital? In large measure, this was because Tirana granted close
proximity to the two “blocks”: the bourgeois Bllok of Politburo homes and
the Soviet bloc. Those most likely to be informed on the evolving situation
abroad, and thus also more likely to bring up grievances, were relatively well-
placed functionaries in the country’s chief state agencies in the capital. Dis-
gruntled former landowners, hostile highlander chiefs, and revengeful fallen
party cadres did not foment these early discussions. Rather, they originated
with intellectual types, heads of departments, and Central Committee rank-
and-ªle, as well as ofªcials in industry and trade, the radio network, the
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Soviet-built ªlm studio (New Albania), the Higher Party School, and the
party newspaper. The disgruntled were party associates who enjoyed direct ac-
cess to foreign media outlets. Some who worked for the “foreign affairs”
(meaning Soviet bloc) sections of the various branch ministries and enter-
prises. They constituted, in short, Albania’s ties to the socialist world.
Some of them had even studied in other socialist countries, notably the
USSR. The situation was ironic: The most vocal critics of the establishment
turned out to be graduates of universities and short-term training programs in
the Soviet Union. The Soviet embassy in Tirana struck an almost embarrassed
note when relaying such facts to Moscow. These were people who owed their
careers and plum appointments in large part to their Soviet credentials.
Whence their “anti-party turn”? Party authorities claimed to know the answer.
They explained to Soviet ofªcials that Albania at the end of the war lacked a
working class. Given planning and stafªng needs, state ofªcials had been
forced to send the children of the former bourgeoisie abroad for training. But
this generation had supposedly failed to integrate fully into Soviet life. To
make matters worse, Albanian authorities admitted having neglected to con-
duct any “educational work” (vospitatel’noi raboty) with them following their
return.52 As with every kind of effective manipulation, this account contained
some truth. Postwar Albania had almost no working class. In the early 1950s
local authorities almost blindly promoted Soviet-trained youths, a telling in-
sight into how Sovietization unfolded. But, if anything, events in April 1956
revealed just how effectively these young men and women had been inte-
grated into Soviet—and party—life. Back in Albania, some of them listened
to Western radio broadcasts and begrudged superiors or other party apparat-
chiks.53 In this, too, they replicated professional scufºes typical of socialist sys-
tems. Their anti-establishment criticism in light of Khrushchev’s blow to Sta-
lin did not come from a supposedly enduring bourgeois consciousness; it was
an act of faith.
Once information about the Twentieth Party Congress made its way into
party circles, it circulated quickly. Conªdential one-on-one conversations es-
calated into full-blown discussions among like-minded party colleagues.
Where else could such matters have been discussed? What other association
could have competed with the party? Spontaneous exchanges emboldened
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party members to bring up the possibility of reforms, in line with what was
taking place in Poland and Hungary. Some complained that party meetings
entirely ignored Moscow’s resolutions or other momentous changes, such as
improved relations with Yugoslavia. The most embittered then decided to
raise these questions in their local party organizations. Upon hearing about
this, others followed suit. They went back to their workplaces and urged their
colleagues to address problems such as the crippled economy and the “cult of
personality” in “the spirit of the Twentieth Party Congress.” When delegates
were chosen for the upcoming Tirana Party Conference, they promised to
bring up these issues there as well.54
These scattered conversations were later woven together as evidence of an
organized conspiracy. In Romania, such exchanges were called “unprincipled
discussions.”55 In Albania, they were “conversations beyond party channels.”
The only facts brought forward (and only internally) to support the charges of
a conspiracy were limited to observations that these ofªcials all shared “opin-
ions and intentions” and that a few of them had known and met each other
before.56 They were guilty, in other words, of party socialization. But none of
these early exchanges were unknown to district and city party bosses. Yet they
did not take any decisive steps to censor them, something Hoxha later
identiªed as an egregious oversight. But if this had been merely an oversight,
it would have hardly caused a storm. Rather, this chain of events provided evi-
dence, yet again, that the party apparatus produced many of its own prob-
lems. Focused on external enemies and consumed with its own privileges, it
had grown overconªdent, neglecting a crucial detail: The party was its own
enemy.
Storm in April
The Tirana Party Conference convened on 14 April in a movie theater called
The Worker. Hoxha was on vacation in the southern coastal city of Vlorë, but
his presence in the capital was widely felt. On the ªrst day of the proceedings,
Zëri i Popullit carried a lengthy article penned by the PPSh leader, who admit-
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ted to past transgressions and abuses, especially in the immediate postwar
years. Remarkably, the article offered full support for Khrushchev’s criticism
of Stalin and implied at least some revision in ongoing class-based policies; it
was an unprecedented public stand. As if to balance the admission of excesses,
however, Hoxha also warned that those who threatened the party’s hold on
power would face the full impact of the dictatorship of the proletariat.57 Ex-
actly what motivated the piece remains unclear, but the timing was impecca-
ble. Whether clever bait, a calculated warning, or neither, the article embold-
ened many of the Tirana party delegates. Some explicitly mentioned it in their
speeches.58 The article seemed to conªrm rumors circulating among party
cadres that Hoxha himself was not averse to reforms but was under pressure
from a circle of staunch Stalinists around him.59 The image of Hoxha as a
moderate has escaped outside observers of Albanian affairs but was in fact
carefully nurtured with public pronouncements and calculated interventions.
If Hoxha’s article seemed promising, the speech delivered on the ªrst day
by Tirana party secretary Fiqret Shehu was utterly ordinary. After she was
ªnished, the audience turned noticeably agitated. Where were the issues
brought up at the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow? Where was the criti-
cal assessment of the Central Committee’s work? Why did party chiefs, whose
spouses avoided manual labor (if they worked at all), enjoy special perks?
What about the bleak economic outlook? Why had relations with Yugoslavia
stalled?60 Ignoring Shehu’s report altogether, delegates took the ºoor one by
one to raise a series of hard-hitting questions about Politburo privileges, nepo-
tism, wages, and purges. Recent press accounts and published post-1991 rec-
ollections have often painted a heroic picture of those speaking at the meet-
ing, but not all participants targeted the establishment and not all questions
were driven by a reformist zeal. Transcripts show that a number of delegates
took aim at colleagues, sought penalties for fellow functionaries they referred
to by name, and confronted the party leadership for not being punitive
enough. This was, after all, a Communist party. Still, intraparty vendettas and
small politics were eclipsed by calls to embrace the Twentieth Soviet Party
Congress.
These interventions came as a shocking surprise. Shehu awkwardly
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eluded most of the questions by addressing only party organizational mat-
ters. Responsibility fell entirely on Beqir Balluku, the Central Committee rep-
resentative who served as the other chair. His responses were invariably
inadequate—such and such question was unfair, the rest were dubious, for ev-
erything else they ought to wait for the party congress. A man of mediocre in-
tellect, Balluku proved no match for the party delegates. (Years later, he was
deemed to have been an enemy all along. The so-called Tirana conference
plot thickened even further.) Some delegates were amused by his hollow re-
sponses, others aggravated. Adriatik Kanani of the Zëri i Popullit party organi-
zation and Veip Demi of Radio Tirana brought up censorship. Articles by
Hungarian leader Mátyás Rákosi and Italian party boss Palmiro Togliatti, they
complained, had been published only in part. Similarly, when Radio Tirana
had broadcast an article by Polish Central Committee Secretary Jerzy Moraw-
ski, the PPSh CC had reprimanded the radio.61 Vandush Vinçani, a high-
ranking party ofªcial responsible for propaganda, argued against Balluku’s in-
sistence that calling Stalin “a despot” was wrong. Khrushchev himself, Vin-
çani pointed out, had done as much.62 Later that evening, Mehmet Shehu
nervously tracked down the Soviet ambassador, L. I. Krylov, and informed
him that the conference had gotten completely out of hand. Some delegates
had gone so far as to suggest that the Yugoslavs lived well whereas the Alba-
nians were worse off than in 1946. The two agreed to intervene “quietly and
carefully, without accusing anyone of hostility.”63 Later that night, Hoxha was
summoned from Vlorë.
The party leader was given an enthusiastic welcome on the second day.
Hoxha’s strategy was to allow the most ardent critics to present their griev-
ances before dealing them a direct blow. In his speech he made clear that the
conference had taken the wrong path. Nevertheless, he managed to appear re-
strained and reconciliatory. He admitted to manifestations of the cult of per-
sonality and oonceded that the PPSh had not rushed to embrace the Twenti-
eth Party Congress resolutions. But the PPSh was not supposed to “parrot”
(shabllonizëm) the other people’s democracies, he asserted. For instance, Hun-
garian Interior Minister László Rajk had been executed on trumped-up
charges, but Koçi Xoxe, the Albanian interior minister, had actually conspired
against the party and had been rightly punished.64 As for Yugoslavia, the Alba-
nians were ready to put the past aside and move forward. To make this ap-
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proach even more convincing, Hoxha lashed out at his wife for employing a
chauffer to drive her to work.65
Neither his presence nor his tone deterred delegates like Iljaz Ahmeti
from going back to concerns over Politburo privileges. Each Central Commit-
tee member, Ahmeti claimed, cost the state one million lekë per year. His ac-
cusation infuriated Hoxha, who aggressively responded. “That, of course, was
somewhat rough on my part,” he later explained to the Soviet ambassador,
“but to allow such demagoguery, especially given the mood of the conference,
would have been impermissible.”66 Ahmeti, however, struck back, reminding
Hoxha that eighteen members of the Central Committee were related by
blood or marriage.67 A recently demobilized army major, Ahmeti had made
no secret of his grievances. As later investigations conªrmed, including party
reports from army defense units, he had openly spoken to his colleagues about
the Twentieth Party Congress as well as about his views on the PPSh leader-
ship. Not only that: Ahmeti’s colleagues had openly supported him. As one of
them later acknowledged to party investigators, “those days we too got in-
volved in all that commotion and said, for example, that they were right on
these issues, that they were rightly bringing up economic concerns.” Others
had gone so far as to demand that Stalin’s portraits be removed from their
ofªces.68
In crushing dissent, Hoxha depicted Ahmeti and his colleagues as a hand-
ful of rotten cadres. These were, he warned, assaults organized by a few, not
the grievances of many. When reassuring Krylov about his ability to normalize
the conference, he also took care to depict the episode as an organized plot to
oust the party leadership. While seeming reconciliatory at the conference, he
appeared unapologetic in front of Krylov. The PPSh leadership had acted cor-
rectly in not distributing Khrushchev’s secret speech, he insisted. As evidence,
he invited the ambassador to look to the German Democratic Republic
(GDR), Hungary, and Poland, where “comrades took it upon themselves to
widely publicize all the issues and questions about the cult.” Such a principled
stand had come at a price. He told Krylov that “some of our workers got the
impression that we were keeping silent on the issue of the cult, though every-
one knows that already in 1954, based on the example of the CPSU, our party
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carried out signiªcant measures to eliminate the cult of personality from our
country, so that now we can only speak of minor vestiges.”69 On Yugoslavia,
he admitted that the issue was “sensitive,” but he relegated Albanian mistakes
to the machinations of Lavrentii Beria’s gang. Tirana was ready to foster better
relations. Hoxha’s efªcient handling of the proceedings impressed Krylov,
who reported to Moscow that the Albanian leader seemed ªrm, conªdent,
hardly nervous.70
The blow came swiftly the next day. Hoxha warned that the party would
crush all those who sought to harm it. As a witness later recalled, when the
delegates heard the ominous reference to “enemies,” they sank into their
seats.71 As Hoxha’s tone grew increasingly virulent, the delegates who had kept
silent up to that point joined the condemning chorus. All dissenters from the
previous two days were forced to undergo self-criticism. The conference effec-
tively turned into a vicious trial. Trying to fend off charges of a conspiracy,
delegates insisted that they had ªrst brought up their concerns in their local
party organizations, but to no avail.72 Hoxha called a Politburo meeting later
that night and opened it in a menacing tone. He noted that the events at the
Tirana Party Conference had been carefully planned to revise the party line
and topple the leadership. He blamed city party bosses as well as the central
apparatus. How was it, he fumed, “that a situation like this could have been
brewing for two-three months already, since the Twentieth Congress; that po-
litical issues have been approached in this spirit and these connections have
been made; and that these people [the central party apparatus] do not even
know about it?” Hoxha denounced “fraternization” within the central party
apparatus and lashed out at Shehu’s wife for “lack of vigilance” and at his own
wife, Nexhmije, who was head of party propaganda.73 “Fraternization,” seem-
ingly, was permissible only at the very top.
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Dragutin Solajic, “Recite cinjenice,” Borba (Belgrade), 19–22 March 1961, p. 2 (same title and page
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for later Western accounts. A major army general and party ofªcial, Panajot Plaku, escaped to Yugosla-
via in May 1957 and furnished brief comments on PPSh affairs to the Yugoslav press in 1961.
73. Transcript of the meeting of the PPSh Politburo, 17 April 1956, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, OU, V.
1956, Dos. 39, Fl. 1–2.
Hoxha denounced not so much the content of the allegations as the fact
that such views had not been stamped out at the root. Echoing the criticism
voiced by speakers at the Tirana conference, he concluded that the party ap-
paratus had grown detached from the rest of society. He claimed that no par-
allels could be drawn between events unfolding in the people’s democracies
and what was going on in Albania. The PPSh had no need to revise past posi-
tions and was therefore not acting against the rest of the socialist camp. At the
Tirana Party Conference, similarly, Hoxha had told delegates that Albania,
like the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea, had nothing to
revise. Those who expected Albania to follow others, Hoxha said, did “not
know the speciªcs of the issues we deal with here.” Xoxe was no Rajk, so no
rehabilitation would be forthcoming.74 Hoxha conceded that they might need
to “look again at some of the decisions of the CC against Communists, espe-
cially against former members of the CC, to see whether they have been fair,
in case there have been any mistakes.”75 However, this proved to be a formal
commitment designed to silence any lingering opposition ahead of the Third
Party Congress.76
The episode proved useful for Hoxha. In the short term, it allowed him
to screen delegates carefully for the congress, at which he was resoundingly
conªrmed in a choreographed show of resolve in front of the Soviet envoy,
Petr Pospelov.77 In his speech, Hoxha noted that “events in the Soviet Union”
as well as measures taken by other fraternal parties in releasing prisoners had
provided fertile ground for anti-party conspiracies.78 In the long term, too,
the episode proved useful in defending a hardline approach both domestically
and in foreign policy. Hoxha told Krylov that from that point onward all
party appointments would be carefully screened and only the most loyal pro-
moted.79 Tirana’s Party Conference had greatly disturbed him, he admitted,
but at least it had played out behind closed doors. What he meant was that an
open display of dissent at the PPSh Congress would have been immensely
more damaging. In any case, the party had now identiªed the enemies among
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77. Hoxha later claimed that Pospelov pressured him to rehabilitate Xoxe, but no evidence has
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78. Transcript of PPSh Politburo meeting, 17 April 1956, in AQSH, F.14/AP, OU, V.1956, Dos. 39,
Fl. 4/1.
79. “Ob izuchenii,” in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 28, D. 391, Ll. 81–82.
its ranks. “We have information,” Hoxha went on, “that the plan against the
CC was strongly fueled by certain ofªcials of the Yugoslav mission.”80 The
same intelligence ofªcials who had missed the alleged conspiracy at the Tirana
Party Conference had now managed, somehow, to identify the Yugoslav cul-
prits in less than three days.81 No matter how improbable, Hoxha’s maneuver
proved useful, and Moscow picked up on the idea that Yugoslavia was behind
the Tirana Party Conference.
Word of the commotion in Tirana quickly got around the country. As
with Khrushchev’s secret speech, the party infrastructure made this possible.
Unlike with Khrushchev’s speech, however, no foreign radios or published
bulletins transmitted the information. Even so, the word got out with aston-
ishing efªciency. Exhaustive reports and investigations carried out over several
months reveal the extent to which rumors and word of mouth spread quickly
across party ranks. In the majority of cases, party ofªcials, correspondents, or
ofªcers who happened to be on duty in the capital in April brought the ru-
mors back with them upon returning to their hometowns. This is a testament
to the level of social mobilization within the relatively young party by the
mid-1950s. In achieving it, the party relied heavily on local community
bonds and interpersonal relationships. Under other circumstances, the party
thrived on the corruption and exploitation of such relationships, through the
introduction of informants or choreographed rumor campaigns. In this case,
however, the routinely effective party techniques seemed to go against the
aims of the party leadership.82
The punitive measures of the Central Committee came in waves. Some
were expelled from the party.83 Several ended up arrested, banished, or in the
clutches of the Sigurimi (presented with the “choice” of serving as informants
or facing persecution, quite a few took up the offer). In accordance with
Hoxha’s instructions, such measures were taken “quietly.” Party members in
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83. These included Naªz Bezhani, Ihsan Budo, Veip Demi, Zija Dibra, Qamil Disha, Pëllumb
Dishnica, Peço Fidhi, Hiqmet Garbi, Pajo Islami, Niazi Jaho, Dhora Leka, Gjovalin Luka, Marie
Luka, Dali Ndreu, Foni Qirko, Viktor Stratobërdha, Nesti Zoto, and Ibrahim Zverku. Twenty-nine
others received “various kinds of penalties.”
the armed forces were shufºed around, and the propaganda apparatus under-
went personnel changes.84 In April and May alone, some 993 ofªcers from the
defense and police units were released from duty and “assigned” to various
jobs around the country.85 Without ofªcially acknowledging so, the Central
Committee also instructed Tirana party ofªcials to address the pervasive
housing shortage in the capital, curtail the burgeoning bureaucracy, and take
stock of local organizational problems.86 As a notable (and Soviet-trained)
lawyer conªdentially informed a Soviet envoy in the aftermath of the confer-
ence, Tirana’s intelligentsia was terriªed and dared not speak. Among those
charged as party enemies, he insisted, “were some very good people” driven by
the purest of intentions.87 The pressure on them steadily mounted. Hoxha
lashed out at the Sigurimi—a tactic he would frequently employ to highlight
the party’s dominant role vis-à-vis the security apparatus—and a surge in se-
curity police activity against alleged anti-party elements ensued.88
On 21 April, the Central Committee sent an internal letter to all rank-
and-ªle party members explaining the events at the Tirana Party Con-
ference.89 Soon thereafter, party organizations mobilized in an effort to iden-
tify and counter suspicious attitudes within their ranks. Remarkably, even
during these somber meetings, some got up to complain about Central Com-
mittee privileges and their own everyday lives of hardship.90 This was espe-
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87. Jusuf Alibali later remarked that if he had attended the Tirana Party Conference, he might have
criticized the party in much the same way. This did not mean he harbored anti-party feelings in his
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tween the Interior Ministry, the Sigurimi, and the PPSh CC, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, DA, V. 1956, Dos.
166. On the surge in “processing” (përpunime) and informers, see also the State Security Department
study on anti-party groups, pp. 166–167.
89. Internal letter of the PPSh CC (Top Secret), 21 April 1956, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, DOPRBP-SI, V.
1956, Dos. 10, Fl. 12–15. That same day, Hoxha explained the incident to representatives of other so-
cialist countries. He informed them that no revision of past charges against Xoxe would be made. See
Tirana (GDR embassy) to Berlin (CC of SED, Abt. Außenpolitik), 3 May 1956, sent to the Politburo
and Ulbricht, in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR [Foundation Ar-
chive of Parties and Mass Organizations of the GDR] (SAPMO), DY30/IV2/20/100, 1–2.
90. See, for example, the memorandum on the 24 April meeting of the party organization of the First
Battalion, First Regiment (Mechanized), 26 April 1956, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, DOPRBP-SI, V. 1956,
Dos. 10, Fl. 26–27. A party member working for the Ministry of People’s Defense admitted he had
cially true in party units within the army. As local party bosses reported, some
of the questions were “almost identical to those of the persons criticized in the
letter.”91 These meetings uniformly embraced the measures taken in Tirana
and almost as uniformly denounced the work of the “ill-disposed elements”
that had allegedly masterminded the conspiracy. Although some claimed not
to have fully understood what had transpired, or pretended not to have un-
derstood, the majority seemed knowledgeable. This category fell roughly into
two groups: those who had more or less openly supported the criticism voiced
at the Tirana Party Conference but now found themselves on the defensive;
and those who saw a fresh opportunity to launch personal attacks against the
ªrst group. The party made possible the appropriation and local reproduction
of the episode.
During these party meetings, some also inadvertently exposed contradic-
tions and inconsistencies in the Central Committee’s position. “How was it
possible,” one question went, “to so effectively uncover all of this hostile anti-
party activity when almost the whole local apparatus in Tirana seems to have
been in error?” Or this: “Why does the letter say that these elements exploited
our party’s internal democracy?” The “party’s internal democracy,” this person
went on, “allows every Communist to say whatever is on their mind.”92 Oth-
ers asked why high-level ofªcials got off lightly (the Politburo decided merely
to demote Shehu’s wife to deputy party secretary at a time when others fared
considerably worse).93 Precisely how many of these questions were genuine
and how many were deliberate provocations to test the party base is impossi-
ble to say. Ofªcials took note of each question asked, and Central Committee
bureaucrats passed the information on to their superiors. To justify them-
selves, if only slightly, local party chiefs noted that their constituents were
“uncultivated,” “politically immature,” or “overly curious.”
Curiosity may have been pervasive, but something else was going on as
well. In the months following the Tirana Party Conference members across
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the country did something the leadership in Tirana found perplexing: they
closely engaged with what was taking place across the Soviet bloc. For years
the party propaganda apparatus had vigorously promoted the other Soviet-
bloc countries among ordinary Albanians: daily newspaper reports about
ºourishing Czechoslovak industries and Bulgarian kolkhozes; plays, radio
bulletins, and folk music marathons; ªlms and documentaries that traveled to
remote villages and factories; endless lectures, gatherings, and exhibitions.
Now that inhabitants were actually paying attention to the rest of Eastern Eu-
rope, the establishment grew alarmed. As meeting records reveal, ordinary
people often interpreted far-away events using local examples with which they
were familiar, such as the woes of collectivization, relentless shortages, or
some spiteful local party hack. Even the dramatic conclusion of the Tirana
Party Conference did not necessarily drown all hopes of change and reform,
though it did silence intellectuals. As rumors about developments in the other
people’s democracies spread across the country throughout summer and early
autumn, hopes revived and speculation peaked.
By May, peasants in the villages around Shkodër simply assumed the ku-
laks would disappear. Reports spread of an imminent rapprochement with
Yugoslavia, news that purportedly caused some to rejoice that Albania would
“become like Yugoslavia.”94 In villages in Elbasan and near Gramsh, local
party organizations quickly moved to rehabilitate the area’s kulaks (there was
even talk of village-wide celebratory dinners and loud drinking sprees).95 In
other villages, too, kulaks assumed that they would soon be rehabilitated.
Peasants in Elbasan had gone so far as to write a letter to the Central Commit-
tee asking that their local collective farm be abolished.96 Party members were
reportedly also taking great liberty in interpreting the “cult of personality.”
Farmers in Librazhd, for example, routinely confronted their superiors for
showing symptoms of “the cult.” In one village, the local party boss accused
the collective farm’s chief—the latter having insisted that women ought to
join men in farming work—of suffering from the afºiction.97 No matter how
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“politically immature,” ordinary party afªliates across the country drew politi-
cally logical conclusions from events taking place abroad. From the bottom
up, they engaged with the PPSh on the party’s own terms. Having forcefully
promoted this political consciousness, the party establishment was deeply dis-
turbed by the outcome.
Bringing the Bloc Home
That events in one corner of the Soviet empire could mean something local
for peasants in remote Albania or even apparatchiks in Tirana was both obvi-
ous and astonishing. A lot of this had to do with the institutional isomorph-
ism brought about by Communist parties and planned economies.98 But a
better understanding of the underlying dynamics requires analysis of the poli-
cies put in place to engineer a new Albanian professional class. Precisely be-
cause party authorities saw the country as an island under threat from Tito’s
Yugoslavia and physically isolated from the rest of the bloc, they desperately
sought Moscow’s security guarantee. If the story of the Soviet bloc is ordi-
narily told in terms of Soviet coercion, resource extraction, and hands-on con-
trol, in the lone Mediterranean outpost the local leaders were the ones who
actively sought out and directly depended on Soviet interference as well as
technical transfer for their regime’s survival. A deªnite economic calculus un-
derlined the pervasive rhetoric of “socialist solidarity” among Soviet-bloc
countries. Albania was the poorest and most peripheral member of the bloc,
and its industrialization effort required huge infusions of equipment, technol-
ogy, and expertise.99 But national interest, as far as Albanian ofªcials were
concerned in the 1950s, happened to converge with subsidies produced by
“socialist solidarity.”
Many of the rebels at the Tirana Party Conference came from a distinct
professional class that emerged in the 1950s out of an extensive state-spon-
sored campaign to build entire professions from scratch. The country at the
time was plagued by high illiteracy rates, and no universities were established
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until 1957. The meager Western-educated professional circle of the interwar
period either did not survive the war or remained politically suspect and
marginalized. Hence, like North Korea, Albania sent hundreds of its youth
each year to other socialist countries for training.100 Soviet specialists increas-
ingly took up positions in the country, and some 3,000 local trainees received
short-term instruction in the Soviet Union in the 1950s.101 “A generation is
being educated in Albania,” one exiled author noted, “that will know only So-
viet culture and will consider it supreme in the world.”102 For a relatively iso-
lated and backward country, this was the promise of a future elite (those
trained in the Soviet Union in the 1950s constituted Albania’s elite for more
than four decades). Even before the war, a number of prosperous Albanian
families had sent their children to receive an education abroad. Under King
Zog’s rule, a system of scholarships for promising young people had been set
up. One of its beneªciaries in the early 1930s was the young Enver Hoxha,
who studied at (but failed to graduate from) the University of Montpellier.
The exchanges in the 1950s, however, were unprecedented in scope and plan-
ning, a model of social engineering.103
During the ªrst half of the 1950s, university spots in the Soviet Union
and other socialist countries became a commodity distributed via the central
plan. As with other aspects of early planning, this effort was fraught with
errors. State agencies had a hard time allocating university spots because bud-
gets and planning targets had a tendency to ºuctuate halfway through the aca-
demic year. As a result, education bureaucrats often switched students’ disci-
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plines in the middle of their studies—an act that might have “corrected”
planning errors but infuriated the students. Some spent many months in their
host countries without knowing what they would study, as ofªcials back
home scrambled to allocate names to priority ªelds and planning estimates.
Others, especially those in the upper years, often waited for months to receive
approval from Tirana on everything from thesis topics to marriage requests or
even summer vacation plans. Albania’s integration into this state-controlled
transnational ºow of people and knowledge was no doubt advantageous and
unprecedented, but was far from smooth.104
Beyond the technical hitches of the central plan, postwar education poli-
cies reºected the party’s ideological position on the class struggle. A higher ed-
ucation abroad was a privilege that party and state ofªcials gladly handed out
to reward young people from well-connected families or war veterans (recall
the lack of a working class). Poorer families and party members had prece-
dence over, say, small traders, artisans, or the politically uninvolved. Yet, as au-
thorities admitted to Krylov following the Tirana Party Conference in April
1956, available candidates often lacked the “right” political credentials. Com-
promises had to be made. As written requests for scholarships attest, eager ap-
plicants soon learned to recount the “correct” life narrative in order to obtain
a university spot abroad. Ultimately, allocation resulted from a combination
of ideological guidelines and improvisation, high-minded social engineering
with blatant nepotism, a necessarily imperfect outcome of the application of
proletarian policies in a country with scarcely any proletariat.105 Student lists
from the late 1940s and early 1950s abound with familiar last names, as Cen-
tral Committee members and high-ranking ofªcials sent siblings, relatives, or
cronies to the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Politburo
members often knew by name the students they sent to elite Soviet military
academies.106
Education in the Soviet Union and the people’s democracies was sup-
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posed to produce socialist Albania’s political, military, and technical elite. But
education also produced a serious problem: how to control these young and
politically naive men and women. One idea was to bring the party to them.
By 1955 student party organizations had been established everywhere from
Moscow to Soªa. In the Soviet Union, for example, seventeen such entities
for students existed in 1956, as well as twenty-eight for ofªcers in training.107
That was a high level of organization, even compared to the rest of the Soviet
bloc countries. Organizations in Moscow had a central coordinating body,
whereas others relied on embassy personnel, who ªled reports on academic
progress, political behavior, and students’ mood.108 These reports, as well as
contemporary correspondence and memoirs, reveal that exposure to life in
Moscow, Leningrad, Prague, and Warsaw made a profound impression on Al-
banian students, who often arrived from tiny villages carrying a wooden suit-
case and a winter coat. A new world—the socialist world—opened up in front
of them. The realization was bittersweet because their home country appeared
considerably backward compared to their host country. The socialist civiliza-
tion they encountered, with its plethora of nationalities and languages, was
awe-inspiring.
Most of the Albanian students thrived, but some got into trouble. In
1955, twelve students were repatriated for various infringements, including
one for “lying about the real living conditions in our country” and another for
posing as an Albanian secret service agent.109 By the mid-1950s reports were
emerging that Albanian students had embraced popular music, fashion, and
Western hairdos.110 The mechanisms that the Soviet bloc mobilized to circu-
late people and knowledge could also promote practices deemed anti-socialist.
It was hardly surprising, therefore, that students became involved in the in-
tense discussions following the Twentieth Party Congress. By that point, some
660 Albanian young people were studying abroad, nearly half of whom were
enrolled in Soviet universities. After Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, Hungary
hosted the largest number, at 68.111 As Albanian ofªcials came to ªnd out,
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schools, and courses abroad, 13 March 1956, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, DA, V. 1956, Dos. 160, Fl. 19–22.
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111. Statistics from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in AMPJ, V. 1956, Dos. 16/1, Fl. 41. In 1956
alone, Albania requested some 300 additional university spots, twice as many as the previous year
shortly after the Twentieth Party Congress Soviet ofªcials had called univer-
sity meetings to discuss Stalin’s “cult of personality.” Because the meetings in-
cluded foreign students, several of the Albanians asked the embassy to clarify
why the press in Tirana was keeping silent on the issue.112 Similar problems
were reported with students from Poland.113 A report prepared for the Polish
United Workers’ Party concluded that many students had come “under the
inºuence of the anti-Marxist and anti-Soviet spirit that pervades the country.”
Some had openly supported the newly reinstated Polish leader Wladyslaw
Gomulka, denounced collectivization, and complained about false and ten-
dentious coverage in the press back home.114 Unlike the story in Czechoslova-
kia, Poland, Hungary, or even Romania, where students rose in protests from
within, Albanian ofªcials were wary of importing the “counterrevolution”
through students abroad.115
In Budapest, too, student grievances predated the turmoil in October.
The embassy there had occasionally warned about ºaring “foreign inºu-
ences.”116 Student accounts also conªrm that relations with Albanian diplo-
mats were poor. In a handwritten letter from 28 September 1956, young peo-
ple complained about missing school supplies and indifferent embassy
personnel.117 As their Hungarian colleagues increasingly demanded better liv-
ing conditions, some Albanian students followed suit. When demonstrations
erupted in Budapest, they supported those too. Precise details about student
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117. Handwritten letter from Budapest, 28 September 1956, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, DA (Foreign Sec-
tion), V.1956, Dos. 192, Fl. 49–50 verso.
behavior during those days are limited. Almost all accounts stem from in-
formants who were unable to monitor their colleagues constantly during
the turmoil. Nevertheless, we know that at least one fellow, Thoma Dardeli,
a student of medicine, assisted in a Budapest hospital treating “counter-
revolutionaries.”118 A fellow medical student, a young woman from Krujë,
was “corrupted” by Hungarian and Yugoslav “counter-revolutionaries” by of-
fering her dorm room for Radio Free Europe listening sessions.119 Yet another
student—the report emphasized his peasant origin—placed on his jacket a
Hungarian ºag with the Communist emblem cut out.120
As chaos griped Budapest, ofªcials in Tirana grew alarmed. On 30 Octo-
ber they ordered all Albanian students and trainees transferred to Romania.121
Although embassy messages conªrm that some students initially refused to
leave, by the second week in November all had been sent home or to neigh-
boring countries.122 Special PPSh envoys were then dispatched from Tirana to
to the Soviet Union, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria to “clar-
ify the situation.”123 They were “appalled” by the anti-Soviet sentiments they
encountered in Poland, where one Albanian university student had allegedly
signed up for a blood drive to help victims in Hungary. (The young man
swore he did not know the destination of the donated blood.124) Upperclass-
men proved to have been the most likely to sympathize with anti-party pro-
testers, having allegedly been “corrupted” over the years. Those recently ar-
rived from Albania were still “clear and showed almost no reservations” in
their political orientation.
Nevertheless, explaining why party members were also the loudest pro-
testers proved more difªcult. The investigative team sent from Tirana recom-
mended removing all students from Poland, warning that the situation there
was hopeless and that religion would soon replace Marxism-Leninism in the
school curriculum.125
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As with “overly curious” peasants, party ofªcials referred to these students
as “wavering” and “confused.” Yet the questions they posed hardly indicated
confusion. What was Tito’s involvement in the events in Hungary? What was
the state of relations with Yugoslavia? What about those who had been
purged? What was Tirana’s stand on Gomulka? Nagy’s fate? What happened
at the Tirana Party Conference?126 “Confused,” it appears, was party-speak for
“asking tough questions.” How party representatives explained these matters
is unclear, as is the matter of how local party activists explained the interna-
tional situation to inhabitants across the country. Reports to the Central
Committee boasted that all suspicions had been cleared—a dubious claim.
Party leaders grew increasingly aware of the potential threat emanating from
the Soviet bloc. By mid-December the Foreign Ministry advised embassies to
hold biweekly meetings with students in order to keep them “abreast of devel-
opments,” a euphemism meaning to keep them under control.127
The immediate impact of foreign-based students on domestic events and
the party’s position was limited. But in the aftermath of the Tirana Party Con-
ference, senior party ofªcials recognized that foreign-educated specialists
would need to be carefully monitored.128 Of particular concern was their po-
tential inºuence after returning home. A December 1956 report submitted to
the PPSh Politburo, for example, noted that Dardeli, the 24-year-old medical
student who had volunteered in a Budapest hospital during the uprising, had
denounced the Soviet Union and the new Hungarian leaders to his family.129
Two years later, party apparatchiks conªrmed that students in Poland and the
GDR had fallen prey to “foreign inºuences” (shfaqje të huaja), including open
displays of sympathy for Tito’s Yugoslavia, voiced suspicions about Albanian
press accounts, and spread rumors about elite perquisites in Tirana.130 Like
34
Mëhilli
126. Memorandum of the Administrative Department of the PPSh CC on the mood of students in
Hungary, n.d. [likely early December 1956], in AQSH, F. 14/AP, DA, V. 1956, Dos. 192, Fl. 57.
127. Tirana to Soªa, Bucharest, Prague, Berlin, Warsaw, Moscow and Beijing, No. 1277 (Top Secret),
17 December 1956, in AMPJ, V. 1956, Dos 16, Fl. 179.
128. Allegations of problematic student behavior had been reported to the PPSh Politburo through-
out the summer, especially when the students involved came from families with party connections.
See, for instance, a summary from the Administrative Department of the PPSh CC on the elaboration
of the CC letter about the Tirana Party Conference among students abroad (with a handwritten note
by Enver Hoxha), 31 July 1956, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, DA, V. 1956, Dos. 192, Fl. 35.
129. Information to the PPSh Politburo on the students in Hungary, n.d. [hand-dated 25 December
1956], in AQSH, F. 14/AP, OU, V. 1957, Dos. 7, Fl. 4. In recent testimony about the events, Dardeli
revealed that he had treated a wounded Soviet soldier at the hospital. The soldier had appeared anx-
ious, but Dardeli had reassured him that he was not Hungarian but “albanets.” The truth hardly mat-
tered. The Politburo canceled Dardeli’s scholarship. Thoma Dardeli, interview on Histori me
zhurmues, Televizioni Klan, 4 January 2009.
130. PPSh CC memorandum on the conditions of students abroad, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, OU, V.
1958, Dos. 34, Fl. 5–6. Within one year, some 27 youths lost their state-funded scholarships because
of “political errors.”
the rebels at the Tirana Party Conference, these young people presented a
problem beyond their limited immediate threat. They embodied both the
promise of a modernizing professional class as well as the threat of “anti-
socialist” practices emanating from the Soviet bloc. Even after Hoxha and his
cronies successfully crushed this new professional class in 1956, they mounted
a second brutal campaign against its members, an effort that culminated in
the 1960s.
The Perpetual Problem
For ªfty years, the PPSh establishment tried to keep it a secret: The Commu-
nist Party (renamed the Party of Labor at Stalin’s behest in 1948) had come
about in the autumn of 1941 in large part through Yugoslav efforts. Not only
did Tito’s envoys bring together the dispersed Communist groupings; they
also played a central role in shaping the party’s structure and designing the
ºedgling state’s institutions. The war produced an odd hybrid—Yugoslav in
form, parochial in content. The party was, nevertheless, an organization deci-
sive enough to ruthlessly crush opponents and competitors (both real and
imagined). The Communists, moreover, claimed exclusive credit for having
liberated the country from the Nazis. Only Tito’s Yugoslavia could boast of
the same achievement. If Albania’s formal conversion into a constituent Yugo-
slav republic did not actually come about, this was not because Hoxha disap-
proved of the idea. Acutely aware of his inferior hand in the power dynamic
with Belgrade, Hoxha was happy to meet Tito’s demands. Stalin initially went
along with the idea of a Balkan federation but became increasingly troubled
by Tito’s expansive ambitions in the region.131 Vacillations in Moscow made
all the difference between a subordinate but independent Albania and a sev-
enth Yugoslav republic. In addition to fracturing the Communist world, the
Stalin-Tito split made Albania—suddenly—relevant.132 From “the epitome of
insigniªcance,” the country swiftly turned into “the Stalinist avant-garde in
the Balkans.”133
At no point during these years was Hoxha’s position at the top of the
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party hierarchy inevitable. He was neither Tito’s chosen leader, nor Moscow’s
favorite. Despite the myth of wartime heroics he later craftily assembled,
other strong and widely popular characters emerged from the war. An intense
power struggle had developed over the years within the PPSh Politburo, es-
pecially between Hoxha and Xoxe. When the Yugoslavs accused the PPSh
leadership of stalling relations in 1947, responsibility fell on the shoulders of
29-year-old Nako Spiru, who was in charge of industries and planning. Xoxe,
the stern proletarian who rose to become interior minister and organizational
party secretary, turned against Spiru, whom he accused of promoting an anti-
Yugoslav line. At this critical time, Hoxha, consumed with his own political
survival, let his young and impressionable colleague take the fall. On the eve
of a high-level investigation, Spiru made desperate attempts to solicit help
from the Soviet Union. On 22 November, the Democratic Front daily Bashk-
imi reported that Spiru had “inadvertently” killed himself “while playing with
his revolver.”134 The ofªcial version was then adjusted to conªrm a suicide.
After being eulogized, Spiru was publicly condemned as a traitor and then re-
habilitated following the split with Belgrade.
As Stalin grew increasingly impatient with Tito’s independent agenda in
early 1948, Soviet-Yugoslav relations took a decisive turn for the worse. Xoxe
was the ªrst East European high-ranking ofªcial to be put to death as a pro-
Yugoslav conspirator. Hoxha was then able to charge the slain minister with
responsibility for almost all the abuses of the security apparatus. “I can speak
with competence on this subject, having later served as minister of interior for
six years,” Shehu explained to visiting Chinese ofªcials in 1957. “There are
hardly any cases from Koçi Xoxe’s days that were handled according to social-
ist laws.”135 To be sure, the PPSh leaders were not an undifferentiated whole.
But, as Shehu’s admission suggests, Communist party leaders were held to-
gether not solely by fear but by a common recent history of violence and fab-
rications. If the PPSh was founded on an original crime—or, rather, a series of
crimes and sectarian violence unleashed during the war—the bloody bodies of
Spiru and Xoxe were the gruesome scenes of its baptism.
Not surprisingly, Soviet overtures toward Yugoslavia in 1955 under
Khrushchev perturbed Hoxha.136 Having led the angry anti-Yugoslav attacks
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leader.” See Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to
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over the years, Hoxha could not support rapprochement with Belgrade with-
out being, as one author writes, “the ªrst victim of it.”137 The point is not
merely that Moscow’s new course after Stalin’s death directly threatened
Hoxha’s standing within the party hierarchy. Revised relations with Belgrade,
as the PPSh leaders saw them, necessarily meant a revision of the Albanian
party’s foundational history. The Soviet-Yugoslav split—indeed, Stalinism—
had made Tirana relevant, lifting it from isolation and culminating in the se-
curity guarantee of the Warsaw Pact. Challenging Stalinism raised questions
not only about Hoxha’s hold on power but about the establishment as a
whole. So when the Soviet authorities informed Tirana that a CPSU delega-
tion would visit Belgrade in May 1955 and that the Cominform resolution
from 1949 denouncing Yugoslavia would be rescinded, Hoxha responded
swiftly and angrily. He wrote to Khrushchev that the new Soviet course di-
verged considerably from discussions in June 1954 and even from positions
taken earlier in 1955.138 Hoxha demanded that issues related to “principles”
be brought up only at a special Informburo meeting and that the Soviet dele-
gation refrain from discussing non-technical matters in Belgrade. That the
leader of a country of fewer than 1.5 million would attempt to discipline the
leader of the Soviet Union shows how deep anxieties over Yugoslavia ran
within the echelons of the Albanian party.139
Two days later, following “friendly consultations” with Soviet representa-
tives, Hoxha held a Politburo meeting in his heavily guarded villa to explain
that his response had been hasty. The PPSh should have supported the talks.
Still, he reminded his colleagues that even if Tito admitted all his past
wrongdoings, he would remain “a very suspect Marxist.”140 The Yugoslavs,
Hoxha explained, had erred against the Albanians, and nothing could change
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that “even if the KPJ leadership undergoes self-criticism.”141 During a trip to
Moscow in July, when Hoxha was handed the full Soviet-Yugoslav correspon-
dence, he repeated in a telegram to Shehu that relations “cannot be ªxed with
a letter.”142 Yet, later that year in Moscow, Suslov insisted that the split had
been a mistake driven by baseless accusations. Yugoslavia was on a solid path,
and Albania’s relations with Belgrade needed to be revised. The Soviet Union
wasted no time in orchestrating a Yugoslav-Albanian reunion. “We went to
Tempo,” Hoxha recounted to the Politburo, “as if nothing had ever happened
between us.” As perturbed as he was, Hoxha played the part. “How did this
misfortune fall upon us!” he reportedly exclaimed in front of the Yugoslav
ofªcial. The laughter-ªlled and “heart-felt conversation” lasted two hours.
Mutual courtesies and invitations were exchanged.143 In his 1980s recollec-
tions, Hoxha claimed that the “heartfelt conversation” had actually kept him
awake and angry at night.144
Whatever inºuence Moscow exerted during the second half of 1955, it
paled in comparison to the months following the Twentieth Party Congress.
As other Communist parties took steps to revise their position vis-à-vis Bel-
grade, Yugoslav ofªcials increasingly put pressure on Albanian diplomats:
Why was the PPSh so slow in revising its stand? Why did Albania trail other
bloc countries in rehabilitating ofªcials, like Xoxe, who had been purged as
pro-Yugoslav?145 Dobrivoje Vidib, a former Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow
and then foreign affairs secretary in Belgrade, brought up Rajk and Kostov in
a conversation with the Albanian ambassador on 11 May. “We do not care for
Xoxe,” he explained, “but for everything that has been said against us.”146
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That the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade, Nikolai Firyubin, allegedly had de-
nounced Vidib’s position amounted to little; Firyubin simply urged the Alba-
nians to be patient.147 But patience was the last thing on Hoxha’s mind in May
1956. A broad campaign against alleged party enemies had been launched in
the aftermath of the Tirana Party Conference, an event the Albanian leader
exploited to thwart any serious rapprochement with Belgrade. In the short
term, however, the expedient course was to agree to improved relations so
long as they did not require substantial revision of internal party affairs. Xoxe,
he insisted, was precisely such an internal affair. Even while admitting at the
Third Party Congress that the break with Belgrade had been a mistake,
Hoxha ruled out Xoxe’s rehabilitation.148
The summer of 1956 was a season of uncertainty. When Hoxha was in
Moscow for a meeting of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, he
learned about the content of the Khrushchev-Tito talks. Tito had lambasted
Albanian leaders as a staunch and unreformed bunch who “had not compre-
hended what is happening around us.”149 Khrushchev reportedly assured
Hoxha that he had rebutted the Yugoslav leader by bringing up the Tirana
Party Conference and other Yugoslav efforts to undermine the PPSh—a point
Hoxha subsequently exploited at home.150 Later that summer, Hoxha repeat-
edly complained to the Soviet ambassador about Tito’s alleged schemes.151
Was the self-criticism of the Third Party Congress, he protested, not enough
for Belgrade? Were the Albanians supposed to bow down and ask for forgive-
ness? He stressed that nothing of the sort would happen and that “what the
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Hungarians did—we won’t do that.” The Yugoslav leader had relentlessly pro-
tested against Soviet meddling in Yugoslav affairs, Hoxha charged, but now
Tito was doing the same with Albania (on the issue of Xoxe) only a few years
after Belgrade had attempted to swallow Albania entirely.152 The sense of be-
ing trapped by Moscow’s evolving foreign policy was compounded by limited
possibilities for communication because of the PPSh’s total dependence on
the Soviet embassy for information.153
In internal party discussions, Hoxha’s tone was deªant and severe. To So-
viet leaders, however, he came across as a mediator, someone who could be re-
lied on to control allegedly violent anti-Yugoslav passions among ordinary in-
habitants. In conversations with Krylov, he presented himself as a paciªer
and characterized the decision to play down Xoxe’s rehabilitation as concilia-
tory.154 The Yugoslavs were hardly convinced. Newspapers in Belgrade re-
proached Tirana’s unwillingness to assume responsibility for past errors. Arso
Milatovib, the newly appointed Yugoslav ambassador in Tirana, warned (on
the same day that Albanian diplomats abroad received instructions to resist
Yugoslav pressure at all costs) that improved relations were impossible without
a retraction of past charges.155 When Milatovib complained to the Chinese
ambassador in Tirana, Xu Yixin, that Tirana was unwilling to move forward,
Xu conferred with Krylov. Both diplomats concluded that Yugoslav com-
plaints were unfounded.156 Nevertheless, Hoxha’s unlikely scenarios might
have seemed less credible if Belgrade had not manifested any regional ambi-
tions in the past.157 The Yugoslav case was also not helped by Milatovib, who
reveled in provocations, which he also directed at Soviet diplomats in
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152. Memorandum of meting on 25 July 1956 between Krylov and Hoxha (Secret), 6 August 1956,
in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 28, D. 391, Ll. 141–143.
153. In September 1955, Hoxha had complained to Soviet Ambassador Levychkin that, unlike other
party secretaries, he did not have the option of calling Moscow whenever he needed to. See Memoran-
dum of conversation on 21 September between K. D. Levychkin and Hoxha (Secret), 26 September
1955, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 28, D. 288, L. 185. A few months later, during a reception for Levychkin’s
departure, Hoxha and Shehu spoke at length about the dubious activities of the Yugoslav mission in
Tirana. See Levychkin to CPSU CC (Secret), 10 December 1955, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 28, D. 288,
L. 204.
154. Memorandum of meeting on 12 May 1956 between Krylov and Hoxha (Secret), 28 May 1956,
in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 28, D. 391, L. 35–37.
155. Memorandum of meeting between Foreign Affairs minister Behar Shtylla and Yugoslav Ambassa-
dor Arso Milatovib on 9 July 1956, in AMPJ, V. 1956, Dos. 341, Fl. 101 verso; and Letter/circular
from Foreign Affairs minister Behar Shtylla to representatives abroad (Strictly Personal), 9 July 1956,
in AMPJ, V. 1956, Dos. 16/1, Fl. 38.
156. Memorandum of meeting on 21 July between Krylov and Xu Yixin (Secret), 4 September 1956,
in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 28, D. 391, Ll. 175–176.
157. For a discussion of Yugoslav regional ambitions under Tito, see Perovib, “The Tito-Stalin Split,”
pp. 42–48.
Tirana.158 Coercion and party controls, therefore, helped Hoxha, but external
factors and Yugoslav missteps also played a role. Not everyone in the Commu-
nist world, after all, was enamored with Belgrade. The Soviet bloc contained
plenty of unreformed Stalinists. Tirana-based Communist diplomats in 1956
were a divided lot: the Polish envoy got along with the Yugoslav, but the Bul-
garian and the Hungarian chided Milatovib in talks with Krylov. All of these
factors converged to create a situation in which Hoxha’s ceaseless complaints,
and even his fabrications, could ªnd a sympathetic ear among certain foreign
observers.
When reporting to Moscow in September, the Soviet ambassador praised
Hoxha’s standing within the party and his handling of relations with Bel-
grade.159 Nevertheless, Krylov’s dispatch also noted that the PPSh had failed
to implement directives from the Twentieth Party Congress and complained
that intraparty criticism was rare.160 Hoxha desperately needed a ªrmer dis-
play of support from the USSR. Throughout summer and fall, as relations
with Belgrade became increasingly strained, the PPSh leader routinely pressed
Khrushchev for a formal visit, which would, as Hoxha put it, “help us politi-
cally.”161 With a deteriorating situation in Poland and Hungary, however, the
visit never materialized. During one of the trips to Moscow when Hoxha
pleaded with Khrushchev, the PPSh delegation stopped in Budapest for one
night. Appalled by the troubles afºicting the Hungarian Workers’ Party,
Hoxha urged the Hungarians to defend the party line by all means necessary.
He described to them the events at the Tirana Party Conference and ex-
plained how the PPSh had delivered a decisive “blow” to the perpetrators.162
Communist leaders, he insisted, ought to be prepared to uphold authority by
force. At the time, his hosts found the advice silly.163
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158. During a reception, for example, Milatovib pointedly asked the Soviet attaché in Tirana about
the number of “concentration camps” still operating in the Soviet Union, prompting the astounded
diplomat to pretend he did not understand the question. See Soviet embassy in Tirana to Moscow (Se-
cret), 9 August 1956, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 28, D. 391 Ll. 177.
159. “Ob albano-yugoslavskikh otnosheniyakh,” Krylov to Shepilov (Secret), 24 September 1956, in
RGANI, F. 5, Op. 28, D. 391, Ll. 218–229.
160. Also troubling for Krylov were the numbers of people ºeeing the country. Some 260 had ºed in
the ªrst eight months of the year, compared to only 38 over the whole of the previous year. See “O
politicheskom polozhenii v NR Albanii,” Krylov to Shepilov (Secret), 4 October 1956, in RGANI, F.
5, Op. 28, D. 388, L. 187–189.
161. Transcript of the meeting of the PPSh Politburo, 28 June 1956, in AQSH, F.14/AP, OU, V.
1956, Dos. 45, Fl. 24.
162. Ibid., Fl. 23.
163. Hoxha also brought up Hungary in meetings in Beijing in September but was given contradic-
tory information. Zoltán Szántó, who served as ambassador in Tirana in the late 1940s, told the Alba-
nian delegation that conditions in Budapest were bleak. A high-ranking Soviet party ofªcial, Boris
Budapest and Beyond
Throughout September and October 1956, PPSh leaders anxiously followed
the unfolding events in Hungary. The Foreign Ministry instructed diplomats
abroad to keep a close eye on embassy personnel and stay “vigilant” against
Yugoslav “provocations.”164 Daily cables warned that Albanian students in Bu-
dapest were “under no circumstances to participate in any kind of demonstra-
tions.”165 Incoming information, nevertheless, was in short supply. This was
an outcome, in large part, of party policies. Albania’s ambassador to Hungary,
Bato Karaªli, like numerous other Albanian representatives abroad, was no
career diplomat. He came from a well-known family of war partisans, but he
spoke no foreign languages and was generally unequipped for the task. He
was, in short, a direct product of postwar policies allocating important posts
among veterans who often lacked any formal education. Although unin-
formed and erratic, these men were thought to possess a more valuable fea-
ture: party loyalty. But it also did not help that Karaªli was new to Budapest
(he arrived at some point in August), having previously served in Belgrade.166
Earlier that summer, Yugoslav ofªcials had complained that they had
difªculty communicating with Karaªli (this, during the height of Tirana’s ef-
forts to “normalize” relations with Belgrade).167
Scant information, nevertheless, did not prevent Hoxha from drawing
conclusions about the events in Poland and Hungary. At a party plenum on
22 October, he warned that both countries were headed down a disastrous
path. He also provided yet another litany of alleged Yugoslav efforts to under-
mine the PPSh. “It seems that what they want us to do,” he told the delegates,
“is to bow down in front of them.” But Khrushchev, he reassured the audi-
ence, had offered his full support to the PPSh.168 Hoxha warned that Bel-
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Ponomarev, conªrmed that Hungarian leader Mátyás Rákosi was in the Soviet Union “on vacation,”
but Ponomarev denied Szántó’s pessimistic outlook.
164. Tirana to all embassy chiefs abroad, No. 662–665 (Top Secret), 23 October 1956, in AMPJ, V.
1956, Dos. 16, Fl. 149–150, 162.
165. Tirana to Warsaw and Budapest, No. 679 (Top Secret), 25 October 1956, in AMPJ, V. 1956,
Dos. 16, Fl. 152.
166. Karaªli informed Tirana on the situation within the HWP early in September. Budapest to
Tirana, No. 10 (Top Secret), 8 September 1956, in AMPJ, V. 1956, Dos. 107, Fl. 3.
167. Memorandum on meeting with the Yugoslav ambassador, 21 July 1956, in AMPJ, V. 1956, Dos.
341, Fl. 110 verso. A Foreign Ministry report similarly complained about Karaªli’s limitations. See
Report to the PPSh CC (Secret), 9 August 1956, in AMPJ, V. 1956, Dos. 17, Fl. 26.
168. In fact, when Hoxha met with Suslov in Moscow a month earlier, the Soviet position was mea-
sured at best. Suslov demanded that Albania also revise relations with Greece. As far as Yugoslavia was
concerned, Suslov told Hoxha that Khrushchev was talking to the Yugoslavs and that relations would
be improved. See PPSh Politburo meeting, 9 October 1956, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, OU, V. 1956 Dos.
54, Fl. 30; “Ob albano-grecheskikh otnosheniyakh” (Soviet Foreign Ministry information prepared
for Suslov) (Secret), 2 October 1956, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 28, D. 391, Ll. 181–183; and “O
grade’s aim was “to eliminate the current leadership of the party and state,
meaning the current Central Committee.” But the Albanians would not
“keep silent with the Yugoslavs for the sake of better relations.” Was it not ob-
vious, he asked, that events in Poland and Hungary were aimed at destroying
relations with the Soviet Union? “Even a child understands,” Hoxha went on,
“that without the Soviet Union and the CPSU constantly present, our coun-
try would be in huge trouble.” He then delivered the ªnishing touch:
Comrade Khrushchev has openly defended our party and has kept the Yugoslavs
ªrmly in check with the answers he has given to them, but if things had been
any different, the Yugoslavs would not only have kept on mouthing off but
would have actually stepped right in [jo vetëm do të kishin zgjatur llapën, por do të
kishin futur edhe këmbët].169
Anxiety was at a peak.
Two events moved the Albanians to act. On 30 October, Béla Szalai, who
until a week prior had served as a secretary of the Hungary party’s Central
Committee, sought refuge at the Albanian embassy.170 The next day, another
Hungarian ofªcial from the party’s International Department sought help.171
Disturbed by the evolving situation, Karaªli informed Tirana that high-rank-
ing HWP ofªcials were under threat and that state security operatives were
being “shot on the spot.”172 On 31 October, Shehu sent a cable ordering all
embassies abroad to grant political asylum immediately to any Hungarians
who sought it.173 He also ordered Karaªli to take in “any high-ranking Hun-
garian Communists like Béla Szalai or others who ask for our help” (though
Soviet Ambassador Yurii Andropov did not agree).174 Shehu instructed
Karaªli to ask Andropov for vehicles and weapons they could use to open ªre
“at the bandits” in case they tried to enter the Albanian embassy.175 The Alba-
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grecheskom naselenii v narodnoi respublike Albanii” (Top Secret), 5 October 1956, in RGANI, F. 5,
Op. 28, D. 388, Ll. 169–171.
169. Hoxha’s report to the of the PPSh Third Congress on 22 October 1956 is contained in AQSH, F.
14/AP, OU, V. 1956, Dos. 28.
170. Budapest to Tirana, No. 148 (Top Secret), 30 October 1956, in AMPJ, V. 1956, Dos. 170, Fl. 9.
171. Budapest to Shehu, No. 155 (Top Secret), 2 November 1956, in AMPJ, V. 1956, Dos. 40, Fl.
19–19 verso; Budapest to Tirana, No. 149 (Top Secret), 31 October 1956, in AMPJ, V. 1956, Dos.
107, Fl. 10–10 verso; and Budapest to Tirana, No. 150 (Top Secret), 1 November 1956, in AMPJ, V.
1956, Dos. 107, Fl. 12–12 verso.
172. Budapest to Tirana, No. 149 (Top Secret), 31 October 1956, in AMPJ, V. 1956, Dos. 107, Fl. 10
verso.
173. Shehu to missions abroad (handwritten), 31 October 1956, in AMPJ, V. 1956, Dos. 16, Fl. 143.
174. Shehu to Budapest, No. 760 (handwritten), 31 October 1956, in AMPJ, V. 1956, Dos. 40, Fl.
14–15; Shehu to Budapest (handwritten), No. 777, 31 October 1956, in AMPJ, V. 1956, Dos. 40, Fl.
16; and Budapest to Shehu, No. 156 (Top Secret), 2 November 1956, in AMPJ, V. 1956, Dos. 40, Fl.
17.
175. Handwritten note from Shehu to Budapest, 2 October 1956 [this is clearly a mistake; it should
nian request for “weapons, grenades, automatic guns, and riºes” bafºed An-
dropov. He explained to Karaªli that the Soviet embassy did not stock weap-
ons, that ªghting in such numbers would be useless anyway, and that
diplomats were not supposed to engage in armed conºict.176 Regardless, Kara-
ªli informed Tirana that embassy personnel had managed to acquire two riºes
and two handguns, and he vowed to use them if the opportunity presented
itself.177
With no information forthcoming from Moscow about what was hap-
pening in Budapest, Hoxha appeared particularly agitated at the 3 November
Politburo meeting.178 The party relied on Krylov as its main source of con-
ªdential information from Moscow, but the Soviet ambassador was not deliv-
ering.179 Barely concealing his dismay, Hoxha admitted that circumstances
had forced him to rely on “Western radios, Hungarian radios, and the few bits
from Radio Moscow.”180 Two days later, Shehu reported having complained
in person to Krylov about the fact that the dearth of information had forced
PPSh leaders to have equipment installed in their ofªces in order to receive
Western radio stations.181 At the meeting, Hoxha blamed the Yugoslavs for fo-
menting the unrest in Poland and Hungary. While the precise details were
murky, he asserted, the Albanians had been through enough with the Yugo-
slavs to recognize an “intrigue” when they saw one.182
Hoxha found something all too familiar in the grumbling over Hungary.
Hungary’s Stalinist leaders might have committed some mistakes, Hoxha told
the Politburo, especially in economic matters, but certainly nothing so great
as to warrant a change of leadership. “Only an anti-Marxist and anti-revolu-
tionary orientation against the people’s power,” he claimed, “could stand for
eliminating Communist elements with a long record of activity and a long
revolutionary past.” He denounced János Kádár and Rajk as “bandits,” dis-
missed Imre Nagy “a panderer,” and alleged that Hungarian leaders generally
had proven irresponsibly weak in refusing to “strike hard against such enemy
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be 2 November], in AMPJ, V. 1956, Dos. 40, Fl. 27. Shehu also ordered that all embassy documents
and correspondence be destroyed.
176. Budapest to Tirana, No. 162 (Top Secret), in AMPJ, V.1956, Dos. 40, Fl. 21.
177. Ibid.
178. According to Hoxha, Moscow’s last information to Tirana was on 18 October, when the CPSU
informed other Communist parties of the situation in Poland.
179. Transcript of PPSh Politburo meeting, 3 November 1956, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, OU, V. 1956,
Dos. 57, Fl. 15.
180. Ibid., Fl. 16.
181. Transcript of PPSh Politburo meeting, 5 November 1956, in AQSH, F.14/AP, OU, V. 1956,
Dos. 57, Fl. 29–31.
182. Ibid., Fl. 17.
attempts.”183 But something seemed not quite right in Moscow, either. The So-
viet declaration on relations with socialist countries, issued on 30 October and
published in Zëri i Popullit two days later, had struck him as “excessively self-
critical,” formulated “as if errors have been made in regard to equality and sov-
ereignty.” The PPSh would refuse to acknowledge any Soviet mistakes, he de-
clared, because without the Soviet Union “our people cannot live.”184 Hoxha’s
anxiety was also rooted in potential economic troubles. With Egypt engulfed in
ºames, he warned, “if something happened to us, we would have barely any-
thing at all to eat; we live day to day.”185 Expecting war, peasants might stop de-
liveries. Above all, the future of Soviet and bloc loans was far from certain. In a
preemptive measure the PPSh Politburo, rushed to halt ofªcer demobilization
and reinserted war veterans into the security apparatus.186
The PPSh records for 5 to 13 November, when the Politburo ofªcially
met again, include a suspicious gap. This was a crucial week. Hoxha told
Krylov that high-ranking party leaders discussed Hungary “almost every
night,” but no written evidence of these discussions exists. What the sources
do show is the crippling effect that news of the correspondence between
Khrushchev and Tito had on the PPSh leaders.187 Krylov delivered the letters
directly to Hoxha’s ofªce in two sets. The ªrst set included the Soviet-Yugo-
slav correspondence from 4 to 6 November. No records have surfaced of any
high-level discussion of this set or even any conªrmation of receipt. The sec-
ond set, delivered to Hoxha on 13 November, included Tito’s letter from
8 November (regarding Nagy’s fate) and Khrushchev’s response. From the
transcript of the PPSh Politburo meeting on 13 November, we can infer that
discussion also took place—most likely, informally—about the ªrst set of let-
ters as well, though the nature of these discussions may never be known. Five
days earlier, on 8 November, Hoxha had published a thinly veiled Tito-bash-
ing article in Pravda, an attack that Soviet ofªcials were willing to feature but
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183. Ibid., Fl. 18.
184. Ibid., Fl. 19.
185. Ibid., Fl. 21.
186. Despite maintaining a strict silence on the turmoil in Budapest, Zëri i Popullit ran bold headlines
denouncing the “imperialist aggression” that led to the Suez crisis. The newspaper also ran a series on
the history of the PPSh, printing historical documents that attested to the “iron-clad unity” of the
people and party as well as the crucial role the Soviet Union had played in “saving” Albania.
187. For a detailed account of the correspondence between Khrushchev and Tito during the Hungar-
ian crisis, as well as important background on relations between the two countries during this period,
see Leonid Gibianskii, “N. S. Khrushchev, I. Broz Tito, i vengerskii krizis 1956 g.,” Novaya i
noveishaya istoriya, No. 1 (January–February 1999), pp. 10–29; Leonid Gibianskii, “Le trattative seg-
rete sovietico-jugoslave e la repressione della rivoluzione ungherese del 1956,” Storia Contemporanea,
No. 1 (1994), pp. 57–82; and Leonid Gibianskii, “Soviet-Yugoslav relations and the Hungarian Revo-
lution of 1956,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No. 10 (March 1998), pp. 139–148.
later cited when criticizing Hoxha’s heavy-handed approach to international
affairs.188 Three days later, on 11 November, Tito responded to Hoxha in his
Pula speech.
Evidence of the Khrushchev-Tito talks during the Budapest crisis (and
Khrushchev’s failure to hold any similar talks with Hoxha) came as a shock.
Hoxha informed Krylov that the PPSh strongly disagreed with the decision to
install Kádár and found the consultations with Tito inexplicable. He also told
his Politburo colleagues that the situation was “critical” and that they needed
to “think carefully and weigh their words.”189 An intense discussion ensued,
during which Politburo members raised serious questions about the CPSU
and even suggested aggressively confronting the Soviet leadership. Hoxha
hinted at one point that the whole thing might be Krylov’s fault. On ideologi-
cal issues, Hoxha advised, the PPSh would not keep silent “even if we are left
all alone. We will surely not be left alone for long if we wage a just war in de-
fense of principles.”190 The meeting’s conclusion was to refrain from voicing
any reservation for the time being. Yet, as during the escalating Stalin-Tito
conºict years earlier, Hoxha found himself trapped within a much greater
power dynamic. The Khrushchev-Tito deliberations in 1956 were a disturb-
ing déjà-vu of another period when the PPSh leader’s fate could have gone ei-
ther way. By 1956, however, Hoxha had grown more proªcient in domestic
damage control. He asserted that Central Committee members were “unpre-
pared” to handle news of the Khrushchev-Tito talks, so the matter was kept
secret. In later talks with Krylov, he railed against Tito even though the Soviet
representative urged him to tone down the attacks. Finally, Hoxha laid the
groundwork for an upcoming visit to Moscow during which he planned to
seek explanations and solicit more credits. The country was bankrupt, he told
Krylov, and had been waiting patiently for some ten months. China had just
handed out 30 million rubles’ worth of wheat, rice, and oil. Moscow was
next.191
In the aftermath of the Soviet security organs’ abrupt arrest of Nagy, rela-
tions between Moscow and Belgrade cooled. This reassured Hoxha, but the
underlying problem had not altogether disappeared.
Hoxha continued his relentless protests against Yugoslav interventions in
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188. The article had been sent to Pravda to coincide with the PPSh’s anniversary. Hoxha mentioned it
to the PPSh Politburo as evidence that the CPSU supported the PPSh’s stand on Yugoslavia. Other-
wise, he reasoned, Soviet leaders would not have promptly printed the article. Transcript of the PPSh
Politburo meeting, 13 November 1956, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, OU, V. 1956, Dos. 59, Fl. 23.
189. Ibid., Fl. 1.
190. Ibid., Fl. 33.
191. Memoranda of meetings on 22 and 26 November 1956 between Krylov and Hoxha (Secret), 10
December 1956, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 28, D. 391, Ll. 240–243; and Cheng Xiaohe, “Yishi Xingtai
Zai Zhongguo Lianmeng Waijiao Zhong de Zuoyong: Zhongguo—A’erbania Lianmeng Pouxi,”
internal affairs. Tito’s involvement in the Hungarian events seemed to lend a
degree of plausibility to Hoxha’s complaints. Nevertheless, foreign Commu-
nist observers were shocked to hear that, in such a tense climate, Albanian au-
thorities had decided to execute three persons accused of being on the payroll
of “a foreign service.” The group included a woman, Liri Gega; her husband,
Dali Ndreu; and Peter Bulatovib, a Yugoslav national who had ºed as a
Cominformist in 1948. Observers hardly needed this ªnal detail to ªgure out
which country was meant by “a foreign service.” Even though the proceed-
ings, culminating on 22 November, took place behind closed doors, the exe-
cutions became widely known.192 Rumors eventually spread that Gega had
been pregnant, a fact that Khrushchev would later afªrm publicly, though the
veracity of the claim remains unclear, and the archives bear no evidence to
substantiate the assertion.193 In Moscow, Yugoslav Ambassador Veljko Mibu-
novib complained to Khrushchev that the Albanians had again initiated an
anti-Yugoslav campaign.194 Others around the bloc also took note of, and
were appalled by, the “Stalinist-style” executions.195
Gega, a high-ranking CPA member during the war, had fallen into disfa-
vor with the Albanian Communist leadership in 1944. Ndreu was a reputable
ªgure within the armed partisan forces, but he suffered the consequences of
Gega’s purge. Secret surveillance records reveal that Gega had become a nui-
sance for PPSh leaders. She criticized the party hierarchy, spoke favorably
about Tito’s Yugoslavia, and closely followed the events at the Tirana party
conference. Among other things, Gega refused to accept that Xoxe, whom she
deemed to have been “incompetent,” could have been solely responsible for
postwar abuses.196 She seemed like an obvious target for proclaiming a Yugo-
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Waijiao Pinglun, No. 105 (October 2008), pp. 40–54. I am grateful to Li Qianyu for directing me to
this source.
192. On 24 October, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed diplomats abroad that the three had
been executed as “enemies of the people” and “spies on a foreign payroll.” Tirana to all missions
abroad (except Belgrade), No. 1037 (Top Secret), 24 October 1956, in AMPJ, V. 1956, Dos. 16, Fl.
163.
193. The controversy surrounding Gega’s alleged pregnancy has not been resolved. In recent published
testimony, former high-level CC ofªcials have claimed that Gega had undergone unspeciªed surgery
that would have made it impossible for her to conceive children. Khrushchev thought otherwise and
brought up the charges after the rupture in relations in the early 1960s.
194. Memorandum of conversation on 29 November 1956 between Khrushchev and the Albanian
ambassador in Moscow, Mihal Prifti, (Secret), 3 December 1956, in AMPJ, V. 1956, Dos. 14, Fl. 46;
and Moscow to Tirana, No. 363 (Top Secret), 30 November 1956, in AMPJ, V. 1956, Dos. 341, Fl.
146–147.
195. Gheorghiu-Dej, for instance, told the Soviet counselor in Bucharest the executions had been a
terrible idea in “the current climate.” See “Zapis’ besedy V. F. Nikolaeva s G. Georgy-Dezhem o
pozitsii Yugoslavii po voprosu ob I. Nade i ego gruppe i merakh, neobkhodimykh dlya normalizatsii v
Vengrii” (Top Secret), 26 November 1956, in Volkov, et al., Sovetskii soyuz, p. 694.
196. At a Politburo meeting in September 1955, Hoxha depicted Gega’s “bashing” as a problem that
needed to be dealt with, although at the time he had been inclined to “save” Ndreu. See Transcript of
slav-inspired conspiracy. What made the entire scheme believable, besides
Gega’s genuine affection for the Yugoslav path, was the fact that the three
seem to have been in contact with an ofªcial at the Yugoslav embassy in
Tirana. If Albanian sources are to be believed, Yugoslav ofªcials acted reck-
lessly in this case, too. However, documents linking Gega to the Yugoslavs,
which she supposedly hid, were never found.197 The case was built on provo-
cations and self-incrimination. That the Sigurimi had closely observed the
couple for a long time did not matter. Gega and Ndreu were forced to admit
that they had attempted to pass sensitive information, especially about the
Tirana Party Conference, to the Yugoslavs.198
A month after the executions, Hoxha traveled to Moscow. His extensive
handwritten notes in preparation for the meetings reveal the extent to which
events in Poland and Hungary—and, more importantly, Moscow’s lack of
communication—had perturbed him. The notes include a synopsis of rela-
tions with Yugoslavia going back to 1943, in addition to a brief commentary
about the events in Poland and Hungary. Disagreements between Albania and
Yugoslavia, Hoxha argued in writing, were neither merely regional affairs nor
a product of petty personal squabbles. He evidently wanted to make Soviet
leaders understand that the conºict rested on principles and that it implicated
the whole Soviet bloc. However, during the ªrst meeting with Leonid Brezh-
nev, Boris Ponomarev, and Mikhail Suslov (who did all the talking), Hoxha
was forced to skip the history lesson on Yugoslavia because Suslov complained
that it was old news. The anxious visitor then complained about Tito’s role in
Hungary and also criticized Gomulka, who, he warned, “might go Tito’s way.”
Suslov tried to reassure Hoxha that things were under control. Caught in the
midst of an escalating crisis, he explained, the CPSU had simply not been able
to conduct more extensive consultations prior to the military intervention in
Budapest.199 Finally, he advised Hoxha to support Kádár and Gomulka and to
tone down the rhetoric. The meeting left Hoxha less than satisªed.
Hoxha’s intransigence in Moscow had its limits. He wanted the Soviet au-
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Gega was arrested in August 1956, Hoxha outlined her various infringements to Krylov (Secret), 31
August 1956, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 28, D. 391, L. 165.
197. State Security Department study on anti-party groups, p. 169.
198. Ibid., pp. 171–175. See also the Interior Ministry memorandum on the activity of foreign and
internal enemies (Top Secret), 27 October 1956, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, OU, V.1956, Dos. 60, Fl. 19.
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199. Like others, Hoxha seems to have greatly underestimated the degree of confusion and hesitation
among Soviet leaders on account of Hungary. Report from Hoxha to the PPSh Politburo on meetings
with the CPSU Presidium, 3 January 1957, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, V. 1957, Dos. 6, Fl. 1–39. The actual
minutes and a transcript are held in AQSH, F. 14/AP, M-PK(b)BS, V. 1956, Dos. 18. Hoxha’s hand-
written preparatory notes are held in AQSH, F. 14/AP, M-PK(b)BS, V. 1956, Dos. 18, Fl. 1–35.
thorities to forgive previous loans worth hundreds of millions of rubles, and
he also planned to ask for even more credits. To appease Hoxha, Soviet leaders
were willing to oblige. During a cheerful and boozy ªve-hour dinner held in
honor of the delegation on 23 December, Khrushchev indulged the visitor by
calling the Yugoslav position in international affairs a vinegret. (essentially
equivalent to a “mishmash” in this context).200 In jest, Soviet Presidium mem-
bers took turns calling Nikita Sergeyevich “albanets” (an Albanian). Drunken
merriment combined with seemingly serious pronouncements about Alba-
nia’s strategic location in the Mediterranean and free-ºoating ideas about de-
ploying a Soviet submarine base off the Albanian coast. Three days later, how-
ever, Khrushchev summoned Hoxha to a meeting focused on party affairs and
reprimanded him for the three executions in November. The Soviet carrot-
and-stick tactics were played down to the rest of the PPSh Politburo. “Every-
thing is ªne,” a party telegram to Shehu proclaimed, “you can go happily to
work and hunting now.”201
To what extent, if at all, Hoxha was appeased is difªcult to assess. Little
changed in his approach at home. As he had done for over a year by that
point, he appeared to be in total agreement with Soviet ofªcials in Moscow
but sustained a hard line back in Albania. To Khrushchev’s criticism about the
executions, for example, he responded by complaining about Krylov. Had the
Albanians been given a warning from Moscow, he claimed, the executions
would not have taken place.202 Back in Tirana during a Politburo meeting in
January 1957, however, he had declared the executions necessary to make “an
example out of their treason.” In April 1957 Khrushchev insisted that he had
instructed Krylov to advise the PPSh to halt the executions, but the Soviet
ambassador had allegedly (and inexplicably) failed to carry out his duty. No
record of such a document has been found in the archives, and Hoxha, in
conversation with Khrushchev, denied having received it but does mention it
in The Titoites.203 What the records do show is that Krylov brought up the tri-
als to Hoxha on 13 November. At the time, Hoxha informed him that the tri-
als would go ahead as planned. When this “Soviet intervention” was discussed
in the Politburo later the same day, some wondered whether it was a signal to
halt the trials. Yet the Politburo had decided to go ahead with the executions
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despite what Tito might eventually say and even despite the position of the
CPSU.204
At the third party plenum, held 13–16 February 1957, Hoxha delivered a
scathing critique of the Yugoslavs and mounted a vigorous defense of Stalin’s
legacy. This episode, as one author observed a few years later, “injected an
ideological content into the conºict with Khrushchev and Tito.”205 Deterio-
rating relations between Moscow and Belgrade enabled this forceful stand,
though it did not go unchallenged. During a trip to Moscow in April 1957,
the Albanian leader was severely reprimanded about relations with Belgrade.
When meeting with Khrushchev on 15 April, Hoxha went on a tirade—at
one point Khrushchev complained that it had lasted a full hour—about Yugo-
slav anti-party and anti-state efforts going back to the Tirana Party Confer-
ence. Khrushchev was not impressed. As “southern peoples,” he complained,
Albanian leaders were “warm-blooded” and approached the Yugoslav issue
“nervously.” Even some bloc partners considered them “quarrelsome” (a refer-
ence to the Romanian newspaper Scînteia). When Hoxha nervously inter-
rupted Khrushchev’s rebuttal, the Soviet leader turned angry. “You want to
build your policies based on emotions!” he exclaimed. “The Romanian com-
rades have rightly called you quarrelsome.” Khrushchev blamed Hoxha for
presenting the state of affairs with Yugoslavia as “utterly hopeless,” as if no re-
lations could ever be possible. “According to you,” he added, “we ought to go
back to what Stalin used to do.” The host continued: “When I hear you talk
about these matters, you are boiling inside! The Italians, the Greeks, and the
Turks are no better than the Yugoslavs.” In vain Hoxha attempted to depict
the Yugoslavs as historical enemies. Khrushchev disagreed.206
The Soviet leader then brought up the November executions. Sentencing
a woman to death, he asserted, had “attracted the wrath of the whole world.”
He warned that Tuk Jakova, another purged PPSh ofªcial, should not be exe-
cuted.207 In no uncertain terms, he blamed Hoxha for having promised “self-
50
Mëhilli
204. Transcript of PPSh Politburo meeting, 13 November 1956, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, OU, V.1956.
Dos. 59, Fl. 1–36.
205. Stavro Skendi, “Albania and the Sino-Soviet Conºict,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 3 (April
1962), p. 473.
206. Transcript of conversation with CPSU leaders, 15 April 1957, in AQSH, F. 14/AP, M-PK(b)BS,
V. 1957, Dos. 2.
207. Formerly an organizational secretary and high-ranking party member, Jakova was a party “old
guard” who had once refused to side with Hoxha during an early internal conºict. As retribution, he
was dismissed from his duties for “opportunism” and “a lack of hatred toward class enemies” at the
Ninth Plenum in February 1951. In the post-Stalin era, however, Jakova was emboldened to seek fur-
ther modiªcations in party policies in April 1955, including a new course with Yugoslavia. He also ob-
jected to the distorted ofªcial narrative of the war effort (as evidenced, for example, by the war mu-
seum in Tirana). This narrative presented Hoxha and others around him as heroes, Jakova charged,
but the party had actually been organized by the Yugoslavs. Bedri Spahiu, a CC member and minister
control” in Moscow and then resorting to abuses back in Tirana. The April
1957 dressing-down was comparable in severity only to what PPSh leaders
had endured with Beria in 1953. As usual, in public, Khrushchev resorted to
boasts about Albania’s unparalleled potential to become an example for Asian,
African, and Arab countries. The tiny Mediterranean country, he proclaimed,
was to become a “garden in bloom” of the Soviet bloc. But he also emphasized
the importance of not giving the impression that socialism in Albania was be-
ing built by the Soviet Union. Hoxha and his colleagues, however, were inter-
ested in more Soviet involvement, not less. They asked that the Soviet Union
forgive all loans extended prior to 1955. Moscow agreed to 550 million rubles
(though the published ªgure was lower). Still, the trip left the delegation
conºicted. During Hoxha’s visits to various workplaces and landmarks in Le-
ningrad, Soviet ofªcials forced him to soften his speeches and remove damn-
ing references to Yugoslavia. As he confessed in a later Politburo meeting, he
came away from the trip feeling that Soviet ofªcials did not “understand” the
development of Albania.208
Many of these conversations appear in Hoxha’s later memoirs. Despite
drawing on dialogues almost verbatim from party documents, these accounts
artfully manipulate context and timing to give the impression that Hoxha
stood up to Khrushchev. Nothing of the sort actually took place. In an unset-
tling déjà-vu of the forced meeting with Vukmanovib-Tempo in 1955,
Khrushchev pressed Hoxha at a state dinner to shake hands and raise a toast
with Veljko Mibunovib, the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow. “Truth be told,”
Hoxha later reported, “the atmosphere at dinner was warm but we felt hurt
inside.”209 As in 1955, Hoxha said that he did not sleep the whole night. By
early morning, however, the PPSh leaders allegedly “drew the correct conclu-
sions”: The PPSh had employed the wrong tactics, but the party line against
Yugoslavia had been correct all along. This was a half-hearted admission de-
signed to appease the Soviet Union. “If Khrushchev had not taken this stand,”
Hoxha admitted to the PPSh Politburo, “we would have done as before, said
that we agreed with them but in practice we would have acted differently.”210
For quite some time the PPSh leader had played this intricate balancing game.
Back in Tirana he forcefully emphasized the limits of the concession: The
PPSh would continue to denounce revisionism and opportunism, and the
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1957 and died in prison—ofªcially of complications from illness—two years later.
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209. Ibid., Fl. 23.
210. Ibid., Fl. 24.
party line would not be revised. They would merely need to rethink their tac-
tics. Sure enough, the PPSh leadership quickly resumed, as The Economist had
once put it, “their favorite occupation of attacking Yugoslavia.”211
The Chinese Connection
In late December 1956, less than two weeks after Hoxha’s visit to Moscow,
Peng Zhen from the Chinese Politburo, who was also vice chairman of the
Central Committee of the National People’s Congress, visited Tirana.212 Two
senior PPSh ofªcials, Shehu and Hysni Kapo, offered to give Peng a detailed
overview of relations with Yugoslavia, presenting a remarkable, if selectively
put together, summary. In addition to a lengthy narrative of internal party af-
fairs going back to 1944, they disclosed a series of highly conªdential details,
including the admission that the Albanians had placed explosives in the Corfu
Channel based on Tito’s direct instructions and with Yugoslav technical assis-
tance. (Two British destroyers struck mines in the channel in October 1946,
sparking an early Cold War incident and the ªrst case to be tried at the Inter-
national Court of Justice.) Evidently, Albanian leaders had come to realize
China’s growing role in the Communist world. When the hosts pressed a re-
luctant Peng for a communiqué at the conclusion of the meeting, the Alba-
nian hosts emphasized that China’s endorsement was critical for the PPSh.213
Until late 1956, relations with the Chinese were limited, although Tirana
was among the ªrst to recognize the PRC, exchanging ambassadors in 1954.
In turn, China had proven sympathetic to Albanian economic requests, grant-
ing a long-term loan of 50 million rubles. Beyond that, the CCP kept the Al-
banians abreast of high-level meetings with Yugoslav ofªcials after establish-
ing diplomatic relations with Belgrade in 1955.214 Hoxha met with CCP
Chairman Mao Zedong in September 1956 while attending the Eighth CCP
National Congress, and the Chinese leader told him that neither Tirana nor
Belgrade—but the Informburo—was to blame for the crisis with Yugoslavia
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in 1948. Stalin also came up during the conversation, and Hoxha asserted
that the late Soviet dictator had committed a number of “grave errors”—a de-
tail Hoxha’s later memoirs omit. During the conversation, Mao appeared sur-
prised that relations with Yugoslavia had stalled but nevertheless proved sym-
pathetic to the PPSh.215 At the plenum on 22 October in Tirana, where
Hoxha warned about events in Hungary and Poland, he also conªrmed Mao’s
support for the PPSh’s “Marxist-Leninist line.” This was the ªrst time that
Mao’s teachings and China’s example were forcefully embraced and held up as
an example. The party, Hoxha noted at the plenum, could learn a great deal
from the organizational experience of the Chinese.216
The January 1957 talks with Peng constituted the ªrst serious effort to
mobilize Chinese support. Reiterating Hoxha’s point in Moscow a few weeks
prior, Shehu told the visitor that Yugoslavia was not merely a regional prob-
lem. Going back to 1944, he asserted, the Yugoslavs had consistently plotted
to undermine the PPSh. When Peng asked why the PPSh had been unable to
preempt Belgrade’s numerous conspiracies, Shehu averred that although the
Albanian side “had no facts,” they were convinced that the Yugoslavs had pro-
voked the Budapest crisis, just as they had masterminded the Tirana Party
Conference.217 When Peng asked about Moscow’s stand on the matter, Shehu
argued that the PPSh had the CPSU’s full backing with the exception of a
“formal complaint” about the November executions. Those executions had
been necessary, Shehu insisted, given the dangerous situation at the time.218
He admitted that Albania might have made a few mistakes in handling rela-
tions with Belgrade in 1948, but Stalin’s letters to Tito and the Informburo’s
forceful stand against Yugoslavia had helped preserve Albanian independence.
Without these documents, Shehu declared, “Albania would have been liqui-
dated as a state.” Thus, he concluded, the Albanians considered these docu-
ments “the principal factor that led to a second liberation of Albania.”219
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The messages from the Chinese were mixed. By this point, Beijing was
actively seeking a more central place in East European affairs, but a clear part-
ner had not yet emerged.220 When an Albanian parliamentary delegation re-
turned the visit later that year, Peng summarized the hour-long conversation
he had had with Tito regarding the role of the Soviet Union in bloc affairs.
Peng made clear to the head of the delegation, Rita Marko, that “the USA is
exercising a tremendous pull on the Yugoslavs so it is crucial that we pull
them toward us.”221 In a similar vein, Liu Shaoqi claimed that “Stalin’s policies
at the time [during the split] were not right vis-à-vis Yugoslavia. We went too
far by calling them enemies.”222 As the Chinese became more vocal in interna-
tional Communist affairs, they initially tried to maintain a balance between
Tirana and Belgrade.223 Only in the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet clash did
China conªrm its support and Mao assert that the Albanians had been right
on the Yugoslav issue all along.224
In attempting to court the Chinese, PPSh leaders implicitly acknowl-
edged their anxieties about Soviet positions throughout 1956. Hoxha had be-
come, as François Fejtö writes, “a prisoner of his own loyalty to the socialist
camp.”225 The Tirana Party Conference in April, but also its aftermath,
indicated that the biggest assets for Communist rule in the small Balkan
country—the party and the Soviet bloc—were also the biggest liabilities.
Khrushchev’s secret speech, and rumors about relaxed ideological positions in
other socialist countries, circulated through the party ranks. Coercion enabled
Hoxha to eliminate the disorganized “opposition” at the Tirana Party Confer-
ence, but he was also helped by the fact that a large swath of the party estab-
lishment had been directly implicated in the purges of the late 1940s and the
virulent anti-Yugoslav campaigns. If intraparty discontent had instead
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To this day, opinions differ about whether the ºare-up of criticism at the
Tirana Party Conference was provoked or even orchestrated by the party ap-
paratus itself. Although no available evidence supports the claim of party
involvement, the party establishment undeniably beneªted from the wide-
ranging witch-hunt undertaken in its aftermath. In the short term, party lead-
ers were able to fabricate enemies, purge party ranks, and denounce calls for
reform as Yugoslav-inspired conspiracies. Later they realized that they would
also have to screen all Soviet and East European-trained specialists, students,
and apparatchiks.
During the fall and winter of 1956–1957, the PPSh establishment found
itself in a curious position. Despite deep anxiety about developments in Bu-
dapest and Moscow, Albanian party leaders were nevertheless kept in the
dark. Although this infuriated Hoxha, it also helped him maintain a degree of
control over party ranks. Throughout 1956, Albania’s isolation compounded
the anxiety of the establishment but also made possible the maintenance of a
tight regime of censorship and strict controls. Even as Soviet leaders contin-
ued to reprimand Hoxha in private talks, he continued to pursue a hard line
at home. The bloody suppression of the Hungarian uprising and, more im-
portantly, renewed coolness in Soviet-Yugoslav relations helped Hoxha rein-
force his orthodox position vis-à-vis Belgrade. But the Yugoslav problem did
not abate. Well into 1958, Hoxha and Shehu used every available opportunity
to assail Belgrade’s “revisionism.”226 When Khrushchev ªnally visited Albania
in 1959, he demanded that Yugoslavia not be discussed or even mentioned
during speeches. The Albanians were incensed. “Our party line is correct,”
Hoxha asserted during a tense Politburo meeting convened to discuss Khrush-
chev’s precondition. “There is no doubt about this.”227
The Albanian dilemma in 1956 does not look all that different from the
Soviet dilemma; namely, that “ideology (socialism) and geopolitics (Soviet se-
curity) had been made inseparable.”228 The difference was that Hoxha and his
party colleagues had been on the brink before—at the height of the Stalin-
Tito conºict—and the paranoia vis-à-vis Belgrade had almost turned into a
method of rule. If Tito rejected Soviet and Chinese overtures for the sake of
Yugoslav independence, Hoxha claimed to reject de-Stalinization for the sake
of Albanian independence (from Belgrade). Existing accounts of Communist
Albania have therefore portrayed Hoxha as a ªerce nationalist and the Alba-
nian variant of Communism as deeply shaped by some sort of tribal national-
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ist ethos. In fact, Albania’s choice under Hoxha was “indeªnite Stalinism,”
and the party merely mobilized nationalism to keep reforms at bay. In 1956
Hoxha successfully managed to equate calls for reform with an anti-national
stance. But without the capacity generated by Soviet subsidies (which were
later replaced by the Chinese), as well as external factors beyond his control,
Hoxha’s so-called nationalism would have amounted to little, if anything at
all.229 In exaggerated form, Albania came to embody both the promises and
perils of socialist interactions. Precisely because the country had been so thor-
oughly Sovietized in the 1950s, it mirrored the arbitrariness and inconsisten-
cies of Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization campaign. Just as Stalin had incidentally
helped make Albania internationally relevant in 1948, so Khrushchev inci-
dentally helped to keep it that way. This “mirroring effect” was a fundamental
feature of Communist rule in the small Balkan country and helps explain
how, over time, the PPSh establishment came to believe that Albania embod-
ied Mao’s words, spoken one year after the glorious gathering in Beijing in
1956: “Small states sometimes win over big ones; they succeed over those
better armed; and the weak overcome the strong.”230
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